

LEARNING AND ADAPTING

THE USE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION
IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A handbook
for practitioners

Laura Dawson, Charlie Edwards and Calum Jeffray

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LAURA DAWSON, CHARLIE EDWARDS
AND CALUM JEFFRAY



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Akili ni Mali
[Knowledge is wealth]



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Laura Dawson, Charlie Edwards and Calum Jeffray

May 2014



ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CGCC	Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
CVE	Counter violent extremism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
KTI	Kenya Transition Initiative
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NCPC	National Crime Prevention Centre (Canada)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
REA	Rapid evidence assessment
SWOT	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development



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INTRODUCTION

Overview: This chapter will familiarise readers with the purpose of the handbook. It first discusses the aim of the project and the methodology employed, and then provides instructions on using the handbook.

Aim of the Handbook

IN 2013, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) was awarded a grant under the Kanishka Project to develop a handbook for monitoring and evaluating counter violent extremism (CVE) policies and programmes. The aim of this handbook is to support CVE policy-makers and practitioners (those who design, manage and evaluate CVE programmes), by providing them with key terms regarding violent extremism and radicalisation, describing the purpose of evaluation, and providing examples of key methodologies they can employ to conduct monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in this emerging policy field. The handbook will enable readers to understand why, when and how to conduct an evaluation of a CVE policy, programme or project.

Policy-makers and practitioners understand there is a need to reach beyond security and intelligence measures to tackle the threat posed by violent extremism. Such an approach can be complemented with policies and initiatives focused on responding

to the ideological challenge of terrorism; stopping people from being drawn into terrorism; and working with institutions and communities where individuals are at risk of radicalisation to violence. CVE programmes in the preventive space offer the potential to reduce the risk of increasing numbers of individuals resorting to violence and of creating harm within communities.

As an emerging policy field and a sensitive area for government action, CVE activities are widely scrutinised by parliaments, civil-society organisations and the media. The reason for this scrutiny, according to the widespread view we heard from practitioners in the course of our research, is that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate success in CVE. Good M&E systems are crucial in order for CVE programmes to be implemented effectively, to ensure accountability, and to enhance the effectiveness of successor programmes. In particular, some governments have struggled to justify public money being spent on CVE or to make informed investment decisions based on the demonstrable success or failure of CVE programmes. Our research for this project (of which this handbook is the key output) highlights the lack of work undertaken to evaluate CVE programming.

To date, very few evaluations of the effectiveness and impact of CVE policies and programmes have been conducted either domestically or overseas. Even fewer have been made publicly available. This lack of activity is emphasised as it demonstrates that the current baseline of M&E activity across the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) is low. There are only a handful of examples in the public domain of CVE activities with M&E components—the majority of which are featured in this handbook. To this end, the handbook is designed as an introduction to this policy area, and it describes the benefits of evaluation.

The handbook is one of a number of initiatives the Government of Canada is supporting as part of its role within the GCTF, which

is an informal, multilateral platform that supports the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy worldwide. Within the GCTF's Working Group on CVE, the Government of Canada leads the 'Measurement and Evaluation' workstream, and as part of this work it is developing a compendium of good practices and lessons learned on CVE programme metrics and evaluations to be shared with the GCTF on completion.

The handbook examines the latest literature on useful practices in M&E, reflects current thinking in those governments conducting evaluation exercises, and provides a set of basic tools for policy-makers and practitioners working on CVE.

How to Use this Handbook

The handbook provides readers with guidance on different aspects of undertaking M&E in CVE programming for the purpose of measuring effectiveness and impact. It outlines the key frameworks that will help policy-makers and practitioners understand the context in which M&E takes place, and the theories and frameworks employed to support specific M&E activities. The document also explains the methodologies readers can use when monitoring and/or evaluating a policy area, programme of work or specific project.

The content is divided into short chapters to assist readers in addressing a particular issue. For example, those who are unsure of the development of the CVE field and the main issues within it may wish to consult Chapter I. Those who wish to understand how evaluation has been used in other relevant fields and to look for crossovers with their own work can read Chapter IV.

Chapter I provides an overview of the issue of violent extremism and discusses the key terms of 'radicalisation' and 'countering violent extremism'. It is not meant to denote the extensive research agenda in terrorism studies but rather to

provide information regarding context, definitions and useful practices in different countries.

Chapter II describes the concept and basic tenets of evaluation in order to familiarise readers with the basics of M&E. It describes the purpose of evaluation in the public sector, and particularly CVE. Key challenges relating to evaluation are highlighted by CVE experts from around the world. Finally, the chapter outlines practical issues surrounding the application of evaluation in the CVE field.

Chapter III outlines key evaluation types, tools and technologies to support policy-makers and practitioners with a baseline understanding of what can help them in their work. The types put forward reflect key evaluation terms prevalent in the public sector and which practitioners may wish to consider. The list of tools proposed is not exhaustive, but represents a starting point. The technologies suggested are also promising avenues to pursue.

Chapter IV addresses what can be learned about evaluation from four other social-policy fields: crime prevention, gang prevention, overseas development and peacebuilding projects. One of the most useful areas to examine for comparative purposes in CVE evaluation is crime prevention, given that both sectors focus on 'Prevent' activities, typically involve community-based initiatives, and encounter similar challenges in carrying out M&E. While there are important differences between CVE and crime prevention, useful lessons can be applied from the broad body of existing literature on M&E for crime-prevention programmes.

Chapter V outlines some of the CVE initiatives implemented in different countries, and the M&E lessons that can be learned from these programmes. Although most countries' CVE efforts are in their early stages, there are notable instances of both shortcomings and good practice that can be applied to future CVE initiatives elsewhere.

Some Key Terms Related to CVE

These are some key terms used throughout this handbook that readers should be familiar with:

- **Impact:** the measurable effect a programme has on its target audience, to help assess an intervention's success; can be qualitative or quantitative.
- **Effectiveness:** the extent to which a CVE programme's objectives were achieved.
- **Monitoring:** the capturing of data throughout the cycle of a programme as a means of indicating how well a programme is performing.
- **Evaluation:** the methodological assessment of a process in order to gauge its value towards a certain cause or aim.
- **Outputs:** the direct and measurable products of a program's activities or services, often expressed in terms of units (hours, number of people or completed actions).
- **Outcomes:** the results or impact of these activities or services, often expressed in terms of an increase in understanding, and improvements in desired behaviors or attitudes of participants.

Methodology

The project team applied a structured methodology broken down into three phases to achieve both granular analysis and high-level findings regarding the use of evaluation in CVE policy and practice. The broad aims of the methodology were to collect data to enhance the team's understanding of CVE, identify key debates on M&E and explore specific approaches to evaluation in CVE. The research team gathered evidence through three phases:

- A workshop of key GCTF stakeholders (March 2013)
- A rapid evidence assessment (REA) (March–October 2013)

- Structured bilateral engagement with a range of international subject-matter experts in CVE and evaluation fields (May–November 2013).

Phase 1: Workshop of Key GCTF Stakeholders

Working with Public Safety Canada, the research team identified fifty experts, policy-makers and practitioners in GCTF countries with an interest and expertise in applying evaluation methods to the CVE policy area or analogous fields.

The workshop enabled the research team to achieve multiple aims: enhance their understanding of the main issues in CVE; open up avenues of enquiry as to lessons from related social-policy areas; identify the needs of policy-makers and practitioners; and validate the purpose of the handbook in outlining basic guidance on CVE and offering examples of evaluation models that had been, or could be, applied to this field.

Phase 2: REA to Scope the Evaluation Approaches and Methods Used

The project team also initiated an REA to scope M&E in the CVE field. The REA focused on answering the overarching question: what are the key terms in CVE and what evaluation techniques are or could be applied to the field? The methodology consisted of a rigorous and systematic search and review of the literature.

The evidence collation involved an examination of existing research, including academic journals and reports by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which allowed us to extract information on evaluation approaches in CVE and analogous social policy fields. The research team selected GCTF governments' information portals as key sources because of their comprehensive scope, relevance and usability in outlining CVE

policy – in concert with a targeted search of relevant websites (of overseas development NGOs, for example).

Phase 3: Structured Bilateral Engagement with a Range of International Subject-Matter Experts

The team engaged subject-matter experts to identify current developments in policy formulation and practice, and the key issues facing practitioners in the CVE field. These experts were chosen following dialogue with GCTF member states' government departments, NGOs and law-enforcement agencies. These engagements consisted of semi-structured interviews and the application of a consistent set of questions to interviewees. In some cases a dialogue ensued, which further enriched the evidence base.

The interviews allowed us to focus our review of the literature on CVE through the identification of guidance that may not have been publicly available. They were also instrumental in helping us better understand the specificities of CVE evaluation, as well as similarities and differences in relation to other fields of social policy.

M&E in any area of government is a challenge. In countering violent extremism it is also highly sensitive and at the embryonic stage. As CVE evolves, so too will the way we evaluate success and failure in policy, programming and individual projects. This handbook should be treated as a guide for policy-makers and practitioners as they weave their way through this maze of complexity. There are many pitfalls along the way. Rarely is something as straightforward as it first seems. This handbook will not solve the inherent challenge of demonstrating the impact of a specific initiative, but it will answer many of the questions that are frequently raised when conducting such crucial work at home and abroad.

Introduction: Key Points

- Effective CVE programmes offer the potential to reduce the risk of individuals resorting to violence.
- Monitoring and evaluating these programmes is vital in order to demonstrate the impact and effectiveness of CVE activities (helping to justify the allocation of resources to CVE programmes).
- Very few evaluations of CVE policies and programmes have ever been conducted.
- This handbook provides readers with guidance on the purpose and principles of evaluation, types of evaluation and lessons learned from other fields.
- These lessons learned will highlight key issues that policy-makers and practitioners need to take into consideration, and enable readers to choose the most appropriate M&E methodology for their programme.

I. VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

Overview: This chapter provides an overview of violent extremism and discusses key terms such as ‘radicalisation’, ‘radicalisation to violence’ and ‘countering violent extremism’. It does not summarise the extensive research agenda in terrorism studies, but provides background information on context, definitions and debates. The chapter identifies the challenges of M&E in an area of policy that remains ill-defined.

1.1 Violent Extremism

The terrorist threats we face today are more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider geographical area, and often emanate from countries without effective governance.¹ The GCTF’s framework document states that ‘the growing list of victims of terrorism and their families’ acts as a reminder of the terrible toll of terrorism in terms of human lives.²

Left unchecked, terrorism can spread fear and alarm, and increase social tensions. Continual terrorist attacks (both successful and attempted) demonstrate the global and

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1. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘Global Counterterrorism Forum Political Declaration’, US Department of State, 22 September 2011, <<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/gctf/173353.htm>>, accessed 20 May 2014.
 2. *Ibid.*

increasingly geographically diverse terrorist threat that confronts all societies. Terrorism can originate from far-left and far-right extremist groups, lone actors,³ and nationalist and separatist entities. Today, Al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and those groups inspired by its ideology, pose the greatest terrorist threat. What these groups and individuals share is a desire to attract and recruit supporters and participants to their cause.

In assessing drivers of and pathways to violent radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of all kinds very often draw on ideologies which have been developed, disseminated and popularised by extremist organisations that appear to be non-violent (such as groups that neither use violence nor specifically and openly endorse its use by others).⁴

The term 'radicalisation' is used widely, but a consensus on its definition and drivers has yet to be achieved and past research has proved of little explanatory value.⁵ Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), politicians and policy-makers began to use the term 'radicalisation' or 'violent radicalisation' to describe the attitudes and/or behaviours of predominantly young individuals who subscribe to extreme violent beliefs.

-
3. The term 'lone actor' is potentially misleading, as there is expert consensus that the radicalisation process always involves another person with some influence over the individual in question. It is generally agreed that 'self-radicalisation' is a relatively rare phenomenon and that individuals are usually radicalised by an external agent – whether in person or through Internet sources.
 4. HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, Cm 8092 (London: The Stationery Office, June 2011).
 5. Alex P Schmid, 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review', International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, March 2013.

A respected academic notes that violent radicalisation ‘has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision’.⁶ ‘Radicalisation’ remains a highly contested term; although widely understood as a process, it is context-dependent with no single agreed definition of what constitutes the ‘end point’ of the process. Moreover, what may be deemed ‘radical’ in one setting is ‘mainstream’ in another, according to the political and cultural environment.⁷

Two principal schools within the contemporary debate tend to stress either ‘cognitive radicalisation’, emphasising a person’s beliefs, or ‘behavioural radicalisation’, which emphasises a person’s actions, as the measurable criteria. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), for example, views radicalisation as a largely cognitive development that witnesses the ‘process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate mainstream beliefs toward extreme views’, and can lead to violent criminal behaviour.⁸

This definition takes into account context when assessing levels of radicalisation leading to violent criminal behaviour. While acknowledging potential positive outcomes of ‘radicalisation’, the RCMP’s definition places radicalisation as a concern when the ‘radical thoughts lead to violence, [and] society can be put at risk’.⁹ This idea of radicalisation to violence is the basis of Canada’s

6. *Ibid.*

7. Peter R Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, *International Affairs* (Vol. 89, No. 4, July 2013).

8. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ‘Radicalization to Violence’, <<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/rad/internet/p2-eng.htm>>, accessed 20 May 2014.

9. *Ibid.*

policing approach, and the process with which this handbook is concerned.

Not all those who hold extremist political, ideological or religious views within a society act on those views in a violent manner, and others argue that not all those who commit acts of violent extremism have deeply radical political views.¹⁰ Many factors must be accounted for when attempting to understand the reasoning behind an act of violent extremism. These are often classified as ‘push’ factors, such as the denial of civil liberties or socioeconomic pressures, and ‘pull’ factors, such as the appeal of a particular leader or the social or material benefits of joining a violent extremist group.¹¹ Cognitive radicalisation also emphasises the importance of a ‘cognitive opening’ (an experience of trauma or realisation), which often creates the impetus for radicalisation and makes individuals more receptive to radical ideologies, narratives and leaders.¹²

Some definitions take a less cognitive-based and more action-based view of radicalisation. For example, the British government’s definition of radicalisation does not refer to cognitive preconditions, instead defining it as ‘the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups’.¹³ This addresses the idea of ‘action pathways’ into terrorism.

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10. Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’.
 11. Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: USAID, February 2009).
 12. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, ‘EU Workshop on Effective Programming for Countering Violent Extremism’, summary report from workshop held 26–27 November 2012, Brussels, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news/documents/20121217_eu_cve_workshop_summary_report.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2014.
 13. HM Government, *The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (London: Home Office, June 2009), p. 11.

Definition of radicalisation: The precursor to violent extremism; a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives.

As the Canadian definition indicates, radicalisation can be viewed as a process of change, a personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Recent scholarship argues that becoming radicalised is, for most people, a gradual process and one that requires a progression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily.¹⁴ A person may not become radical overnight, although the influence of an incident may act as a 'catalytic event' (such as an experienced act of discrimination, a perceived attack on Islam such as the 2003 Iraq War, or a 'moral crisis' with the death of a loved one), thus accelerating the process.¹⁵

14. John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 3; Mitchell D Silber and Arvin Bhatt, 'Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat', NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007, ch. 3.

15. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 'Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People', 2012.

Lessons from the front line: If defining ‘radicalisation’, ‘radicalisation to violence’ and even ‘violent radicalisation’ is a challenge, and there is widespread sensitivity around using such terminology, then how do policy-makers and practitioners develop appropriate responses?

As one interviewee said:

We know we’re trying to prevent terrorist activity, but what does that mean? There is no one factor. No one target. It is hard to define what we are measuring. There is no one pathway, no one cause. It can include educational factors, socioeconomic factors, identity factors, boredom factors, political factors, grievances. How do you develop a programme that will tackle all of those factors? You can’t. How do we know we’re even developing a programme that’s of value to any of those factors?

1.2 How CVE Policy has Evolved since 2001

CVE focuses on countering the pull of terrorist recruitment and influence by building resilience among populations vulnerable to violent radicalisation. Over the last decade, government initiatives on CVE have developed from being a reflexive response to terrorist events and become an integrated part or workstream of a co-ordinated national policy to tackle terrorism and address radicalisation to violence.

CVE projects that are conducted abroad must align with the work of the host government. Considerable policy effort and research has been devoted to understanding and crafting both bottom-up and top-down responses to terrorism and violent extremism. Within most counter-terrorism strategies, ‘countering violent extremism’ has become a central area of work, not only under the Prevent pillar but as part of wider law-enforcement efforts. Intelligence operations, law-enforcement investigations, community engagement, police research and government strategic communications all increasingly feature elements of CVE.

Figure 1: Evolution of CVE Policies and Strategies.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of CVE strategy and policies over the past eight years (to September 2013). CVE remains a Western policy tool but is now becoming more commonplace elsewhere, although it is poorly funded in comparison with other areas of counter-terrorism spending.

As previously mentioned, the GCTF is an informal, multilateral platform that supports the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy worldwide. Its CVE working group, set up in 2012 and co-chaired by the United Arab Emirates and the UK, aims to strengthen measures to counter all forms of violent extremism that pose a threat to members' interests.

The working group meets regularly to discuss good practice on issues such as multi-sectoral approaches to CVE, community-oriented policing and community engagement. The working group's publications on CVE evaluation are invaluable resources for policy-makers and practitioners, including such documents as the summary of its practical seminar on M&E techniques for CVE communication programmes,¹⁶ the final report of its symposium on measuring the effectiveness of CVE programming¹⁷ and the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to CVE.¹⁸

The Ankara Memorandum, adopted at the fourth GCTF ministerial meeting in September 2013, addresses the role of government institutions, agencies and civil society in CVE, and

16. Global Counterterrorism Forum, 'Meeting Summary', report from Practical Seminar on Monitoring and Evaluation Techniques for CVE Communication Programs, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 10–11 February 2013.
17. Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Peter Romaniuk and Rafia Barakat, *Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress*, Final Report of Symposium on Measuring the Effectiveness of CVE Programming, Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2013.
18. Global Counterterrorism Forum, 'Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism', 2013..

specifically outlines good practices that countries can use to facilitate this multi-sectoral approach.

Chapter I: Key Points

- In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation to violence, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred.
- 'Radicalisation' is a highly contested term, and while understood as a process, it is context-dependent with no universally recognised end point.
- The Canadian definition of radicalisation to violence recognises it as follows: 'The precursor to violent extremism; a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives'. (Government of Canada, *Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy* [Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2012]).
- CVE has become a central area of work under the Prevent pillar within most counter-terrorism strategies, and has rapidly evolved since 2001.

Policy Overview: GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practice in CVE (September 2013)

Core Principles

- Each state initially needs to understand the nature of violent extremism. States should identify the conditions conducive to violent extremism and assess their own needs.
- Strategies on CVE should be based on scientific analyses.
- Any CVE programme should avoid the identification of violent extremism with any religion, culture, ethnic group, nationality or race.
- Each violent extremist group should be evaluated separately, since a 'one-size-fits-all' approach does not work when dealing with violent extremism.
- Considering violent extremism to be a mere security issue can be misleading. It is a multi-faceted problem that requires multidisciplinary and multi-institutional responses.

Multi-Agency Approaches within the State

- Developing shared understandings of the nature of violent extremism among governmental agencies and non-governmental actors is a critical element of any successful CVE programme.
- States are encouraged to consider comprehensive action in preventing and countering violent extremism, in co-operation with governmental and non-governmental actors.
- Although the role of the government is crucial, a strategy that involves a 'whole-of-society' approach in addition to a 'whole-of-government' one can be effective.
- For a successful CVE strategy to be implemented, an operational co-ordination mechanism is of vital importance.

Public–Private Partnerships

- Civil society can contribute to CVE efforts by providing narratives and messages against violence; presenting alternative and non-violent means to reach shared goals; and promoting institutional diversity.
- It is crucial for states to build trust while working with communities. States should ensure meaningful community participation in order to mobilise the resources of the community.
- States can help civil society in CVE activities.
- States should promote tolerance and facilitate dialogue in society to build communities, to appreciate the differences between them and to understand each other.
- States and society can work together to amplify voices that oppose exploitation of religion by violent extremist groups.

Socio-Economic Approaches

- CVE programming should prioritise youth at risk of radicalisation and recruitment.
- Educational institutions can serve as an important platform in countering violent extremism.
- Promoting economic opportunity among at-risk populations can address a condition conducive to violent extremism.
- Women can be particularly critical actors in local CVE efforts.

The Role of Law-Enforcement Agencies

- Law-enforcement agencies should acknowledge that one of the most vital rules of CVE is building trust with those particularly at risk.
- States should provide training to law-enforcement officers in CVE-related matters.

II. EVALUATING CVE: PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

Overview: This chapter first describes the purpose of M&E in public policy, and specifically CVE policy, outlining the benefits which may be achieved and key components to be employed. It then presents four fundamental challenges that have been highlighted by CVE experts from around the world and explores how a number of governments are approaching CVE and, critically, M&E within their programmes.

2.1 Defining Monitoring and Evaluation

It is recognised that M&E are defined in different ways, according to context. For the purposes of this handbook we define M&E in practical and inter-related terms:

- **Monitoring** is the capturing of data throughout the cycle of a programme as a means of indicating how well it is performing at the activity and output levels.
- **Evaluation** is the systematic assessment of a programme (using the monitoring data) to establish how well it is performing when measured against the standards and goals set out in policy or strategy documents.¹

1. Robert Lahey, 'A Framework for Developing an Effective Monitoring and Evaluation System in the Public Sector: Key Considerations from International Experience', undated, <www.ideas-int.org/documents/Document.cfm?docID=160>, accessed 20 May 2014.

2.2 Why Monitor?

Establishing a clear monitoring system is critical to a sound methodological approach to evaluation. Ensuring that all partners know what the intervention is trying to achieve, what the baseline is, what needs to be measured and at what intervals, helps to build understanding of and confidence in the project. Clear criteria and indicators need to be defined from the outset in order to assess progress and performance objectively.

An effective monitoring system does more than solely track the deliverables of a programme or policy; it offers accurate and in-depth information on the suitability of activities, the input from stakeholders and the allocation of resources. A monitoring system can also capture unintended consequences of programmes and so be helpful in reviewing any necessary changes in direction of a project, as well as providing an opportunity for lesson-learning. Regular reporting can further ensure that the project donor has confidence in the progress of the work.

In addition to producing reports, a comprehensive monitoring approach maintains a balance between the provision of data and technical documents, independent confirmation of the accuracy of results, and regular feedback from participants and stakeholders:²

- **Data and analysis:** obtaining and analysing documentation from projects that provides information on progress (examples include delivery reports, and substantive and technical documents).
- **Validation:** checking or verifying whether or not the reported progress is accurate (through field visits, spot checks and contributor surveys).

2. United Nations Development Programme, 'Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results' New York, 2009.

- **Participation:** obtaining feedback from partners and beneficiaries on progress and proposed actions (through convening steering-committee, stakeholder and focus-group meetings).

Monitoring should not be viewed in the same vein as evaluation. These two processes should work in a complementary fashion. Monitoring should provide regular information and data for the evaluation process to address larger policy-implementation issues.

2.3 Why Evaluate?

Evaluation systems assist government departments and those NGOs receiving government support in ensuring that CVE programmes remain efficient and relevant, and achieve the desired results. Another aim of evaluation in public-policy areas like CVE is transparency, and holding public servants and recipients of public funds to account by ensuring that resources such as money and staff are used appropriately and effectively. These findings are then disclosed to stakeholders and used to inform resource allocation and other decisions. Thus, the twin aims of evaluation are to improve effectiveness and ensure accountability to stakeholders. They require different indicators and metrics.

Accountability also requires comparing performance to *ex-ante* commitments and targets, using methods that obtain internal validity of measurement, ensuring credibility of analysis, and disclosing findings to as broad a range of stakeholders as possible. A requirement in any accountability exercise is ensuring that the evaluation is proportionate to the programme's size and objective.

Evaluation of projects can systematically generate knowledge about the magnitude and determinants of project performance, permitting those who develop projects and strategies to refine the design and introduce improvements into future efforts. In

addition to addressing issues of accountability and learning, M&E therefore also serve as an essential aspect of good management.

Good evaluation systems³ are needed for CVE programmes to be implemented effectively, and for successor programmes to be made more effective. M&E also track involvement of key stakeholders in all stages of the activity cycle, which is necessary to ensure that CVE programmes deliver results. Partnerships with stakeholders should ideally start at the identification stage and continue right through to evaluation. Unless local stakeholders have strong ownership of the CVE programme, the potential benefits are unlikely to be achieved.

It is essential to develop a series of basic questions to understand the overall approach and intended impact of any evaluation. In 2009, the UK Home Office designed a nine-step approach to evaluation which illustrated key questions and considerations (see opposite).⁴ Using this approach, the questions that should be considered from the outset of the M&E process include:

- What is the intended outcome?
- What are we trying to evaluate?
- How is this being achieved?
- What outputs result from this process?
- What effects do these outputs have?
- What worked well and what did not? Why or why not?
- How do we demonstrate success?
- What would we change in future as a result?
- What implications does this have for other programmes and/or activities?⁵

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3. For examples of successful, more mature evaluation models from other related sectors, see Chapter IV.
 4. Home Office, *Passport to Evaluation 2.0*, London, May 2009.
 5. Scottish Government, 'Safer Communities Programme: Evaluation: A Basic Guide to Evaluation', Community Safety Unit, Edinburgh, February 2010.

UK Home Office: Nine Stages of an Evaluation

The following stages are important for carrying out an evaluation. One approach to evaluation sees it as a project-management process. When carrying out an evaluation of a project, you can approach it as a project in its own right, ensuring it is planned and organised properly. These steps are useful to act as prompts:

1. **Identify why you are carrying out the evaluation and establish what the research question should be** (for example, how much impact does the CVE programme under review have on terrorist recruitment?)
2. **Decide how you will measure the impact of the project or initiative.** It is important to have some idea of what success looks like.
3. **Identify what data you will need for the evaluation and for setting up the processes for collecting that data.** This will also help to establish what the gaps are.
4. **Decide how you will analyse the data.** What is the timescale? How long does it take to see the results of CVE programmes?
5. **Look at the logistics.** Consider issues such as the control of the outputs of the project, the importance of leadership and partnership working, and the resources of the partners in terms of time, human-resources and financial input.
6. **Identify who is responsible for making the evaluation.** Engagement with CVE experts has highlighted the importance of understanding how the profile of the evaluator contributes different elements to an evaluation. An insider can offer understanding of a project's key drivers and be focused on lesson learning, but an outsider can offer challenging and new perspectives, and focus minds on impact. One approach may be to conduct a peer review where evaluators have subject-specific knowledge but also are independent and so free to challenge effectively.
7. **Carry out the evaluation** – collecting and analysing the data and arriving at your conclusions.
8. **Publish your findings.** Consider robustness of evidence and sharing new ideas. Develop best practice and share lessons learnt.
9. **Understand how the findings will be acted on.** Consider the level of detail and the required audience (it is usually beneficial to produce reports at several different levels).

2.4 Creating a Feedback Loop in Policy and Practice

While feeding into the policy cycle is an essential feature of evaluation, ensuring something is done with your evidence is a further challenge. How can the programme be improved? Following evaluation, how should the programme or elements of the programme change?


Working with the project team is an important step. Stakeholders said this was crucial to think about when designing the evaluation and integrating it into the project. Interviewees also emphasised that clients and those responsible for M&E need to allocate time for this dialogue and it needs to be viewed as a key project deliverable (rather than an accessory to the project). It is also important to consider what parts of the evaluation can be shared with, for instance, those associated with the work and in some cases the wider community of stakeholders. Figure 2 shows how evaluation can form an integral of the programme cycle.

Interviewees stressed that too often there is a disconnect between a programme's or project's aims, which have been designed by policy-makers at the centre, and the realities on the ground where NGOs and community groups are operating.

2.5 What is being Evaluated?

From the very outset of programme design, it is necessary to consider what the intended outcome of the programme is in order to provide the basis of the evaluation process. What is the expected outcome and what needs to be measured to gauge whether or not this has been achieved? For example, it might be a change in attitudes, the increase or reduction in a particular activity, or altered patterns of behaviour. Determining an appropriate research question allows for the formulation of suitable targets and indicators.

Figure 2: The Programme Evaluation Cycle.



Source: Integrity Research and Consultancy.

2.6 The Role of Performance Indicators

Setting targets is a crucial step in developing indicators for the programme which tell stakeholders whether a specific programme has been successful and what factors did or did not contribute to this result. Multiple performance indicators ensure that the effectiveness and impact of a programme can be measured and causal links established between the activity and the observed outcome.

The World Health Organization has conducted extensive research to refine the indicators used to monitor and evaluate drug policies, identifying four categories of drug-policy indicators: background information (national contextual data); structural

indicators (assessing the pharmaceutical system's capacity to achieve its policy objectives); process indicators (the degree to which activities necessary to attain the objectives are carried out, and their progress over time); and outcome indicators (measuring the results achieved and the changes that can be attributed to the implementation of the national drug policy). It is possible to use selected subsets of these indicators to meet the needs of those designing and evaluating programmes.⁶

SMART Principles to Apply When Thinking about Indicators

The principles should be:

Specific: all targets should have specific outcomes – for example, to reduce violent crime.

Measurable: the outcome should be capable of being measured – for example, to reduce instances of violent behaviour in a given district.

Achievable: reaching the target can be challenging, but it must be possible to reach it within the established timescales, as well as with the resources and skills available.

Realistic: targets should not be set too high and should be physically possible to achieve.

Timebound: a timescale should be set with a fixed deadline for achieving the target.

An ideal evaluation framework incorporates quantitative and qualitative data and methods, but if at all possible mixed

6. World Health Organization, *How to Develop and Implement a National Drug Policy*, 2nd ed. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001).

methods should be used, including, for example, surveys and/ or questionnaires, supplemented by more detailed informant interviews, which verify the quantitative findings. In recent years there has been a push by funders for impact evaluations,⁷ often problematic for CVE interventions. The specific methodology depends on the scope and shape of the intervention, what the person responsible is trying to find out, and who they are engaging. In carrying out such an evaluation study, it is important to make its limitations in relation to CVE clear.

Creating categories of indicators of which subsets can be used depends on the context of each country's CVE programme. However, there are disadvantages to using indicators: they may be poorly defined, limiting their utility in measuring effectiveness and impact; there may be a tendency to define too many indicators, or those without accessible data sources, making systems costly, impractical and likely to be underused; and there is often a trade-off between picking the optimal or desired indicators and having to accept the indicators that can be measured using existing data.⁸

When measuring the effectiveness of CVE programmes, it is important to consider the longer-term outcomes and impacts of the various programmes, as results are generally seen on a longer timescale. It is also important to put in place a benchmark

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7. According to the World Bank, 'An impact evaluation assesses changes in the well-being of individuals, households, communities or firms that can be attributed to a particular project, program or policy. The central impact evaluation question is what would have happened to those receiving the intervention if they had not in fact received the program'. See World Bank, 'Impact Evaluation', <bit.ly/1jKBADn>, accessed 20 May 2014.
 8. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 'Monitoring and Evaluation: Some Tools, Methods and Approaches', 2004, <bit.ly/1gJ5KcM>, accessed 20 May 2014.

to determine whether the outcomes are attributable to the programme rather than to an external causal factor.

Evaluation in Practice: The Experience from De-Radicalisation Programmes

De-radicalisation programmes have been established in a number of countries. In a review of how evaluation processes have been applied, two prominent academics have noted that ‘no program has formally identified valid and reliable indicators of successful de-radicalisation or even disengagement, whether couched in cultural, psychological, or other terms. Consequently, any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of any such program is beset with a myriad of challenges that are as much conceptual as they are practical’.*

Many national programmes are consequently setting up more stringent M&E structures throughout a programme lifecycle, including more effective monitoring of individuals after they have left the programme, and evaluating post-programme management. At a recent GCTF working group it was noted that M&E need to be incorporated ‘at inception as part of an active feedback cycle as opposed to being used only to generate end-state documents’. It is also necessary to increase transparency and to disseminate data from other countries programmes to establish best practice.

* John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, ‘Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs’, *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Vol. 22, pp. 267–91, 2010).

When measuring the impact of a programme it is important to know what would happen if such a programme were not in place, in order to establish whether desired outcomes were met. Where

possible, measure the counterfactual – the hypothetical situation that would have occurred had the programme not existed.⁹

To determine whether a policy programme has had any impact we must collect and analyse the data gathered during the monitoring period. To do this it is necessary to identify what data is needed to measure the programme's impact, when it should be collected and in what format. It is also necessary to ask whether the data needed for the selected indicators is readily available, reliable and sufficiently accurate so as not to distort results.¹⁰

2.7 Challenges in Measuring Effectiveness

Many practitioners described evaluating domestic and international CVE work as an extremely challenging process. Principal difficulties include the length of time taken for outcomes to emerge, and building trust with individuals and communities who are partners of CVE interventions. Individuals participating in CVE activities may be hard to reach and reluctant to engage in evaluation. It is also worth emphasising that there are very few CVE programmes to draw from. Moreover, and crucially, there are no validated scales to measure the levels of support for violent extremism among individuals; therefore, understanding context, using proxies such as behaviours, and making the most of expert judgement are important.


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9. Susan Purdon, Carli Lessof, Kandy Woodfield and Caroline Bryson, *Research Methods for Policy Evaluation*, Department for Work and Pensions Research Working Paper No. 2, National Centre for Social Research, 2001, <<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100303161939/http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/WP2.pdf>>.
 10. Home Office, Passport to Evaluation 2.0; Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 'Supporting Effective Evaluations: A Guide to Developing Performance Measurement Strategies', <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/dpms-esmr/dpms-esmr00-eng.asp>>, accessed 20 May 2014.

In the course of our research, interviewees identified the main challenges when measuring effectiveness as being causality attribution and indicators, and the collection of data and the perceptions of citizens where an evaluation took place. Identifying causality means being able to confidently attribute any alignment of behaviour toward programme goals by programme participants as a direct result of the programme processes and not any confounding factor.

The difficulty of attributing any changes to a programme is why developing accurate indicators of CVE and/or radicalisation is so important. General indicators such as a decrease in terrorist incidents in the country can be fairly useful, but they do not demonstrate the level of extremism in a country nor the intent and capability of a potential terrorist cell or lone actor. They may be attributable to a multitude of other factors, including better intelligence and law-enforcement activity, and not the result of less violent action by the radicalised individuals targeted by programmes.

This section describes four key issues that will help policy-makers and practitioners to frame their evaluation and ensure that the impact and effectiveness of programmes are measured successfully (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Challenges in Measuring Impact and Effectiveness.



Challenge 1: The Problem of Agency – Identifying the Actor(s) Responsible for Decision-Making

The issue of agency – identifying who was or is responsible for a policy or programme, how decisions are made and their intended purpose – is fundamental to the evaluation of programmes and projects. It addresses the question ‘Who makes the key decisions?’ or ‘In what setting and through what processes are these decisions taken?’ The problem of agency is difficult to determine in CVE where the interface between the state, local authorities, police and community is complex.

As agency becomes more dispersed among multiple decision-makers, this creates problems for those designing

evaluations. For example, CVE programmes can often involve collaboration between multiple policy-makers and practitioners at the international, regional and local levels with various law-enforcement officials and practitioners on the ground. On the macro level, this was identified as the ‘problem of many hands’. The academic Nicoletta Stame develops this idea into horizontal and vertical complexities by arguing that policy-makers are now in the habit of combining services such as healthcare and employment, transport and urban regeneration into one unit.¹¹

In some countries this is the case for CVE, as it bridges social-cohesion and counter-terrorism departmental mandates. In other countries, CVE is the responsibility of military actors and of the police and government (for example, the African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM – has sponsored de-radicalisation projects in Somalia). Moreover, the multi-level systems of government that now exist – such as European, national, regional and local governments – have created a dynamic decision-making structure. The ‘problem of many hands’ means that those designing programmes and undertaking evaluations need to engage not just one decision-maker, but rather understand a potentially long chain of interactions – namely, feedback loops – which culminate in actions and particular outcomes.

Addressing the Problem of Agency in CVE

Evaluation in CVE requires an appreciation of an increase in the number of actors and the impact of their decision-making on a programme. For CVE, the problem of agency can be better tackled by using evaluation techniques outlined in Chapter III, such as:

- Logic models (outlining assumptions and actors).
- Process mapping (outlining key activities and linkages between actors).
- Interactive exchange and early consultation in programme design through interviews, focus groups and the Delphi method.

Challenge 2: The Problem of Attribution – Determining the Causality between Inputs and Outcomes

Understanding attribution – what was causally necessary for an outcome to be achieved – is a key issue in evaluation, particularly when applying an impact-evaluation framework. The question is: To what extent can changes in outcomes of interest be attributed to a particular intervention? Attribution involves isolating and estimating accurately the particular contribution of an intervention and ensuring that causality runs from the intervention to the outcome.

The changes in welfare for a particular group of people can be observed by undertaking ‘before and after’ studies, but these rarely measure impact accurately. Baseline data (collated before the intervention) and end-line data (collated after the intervention) give facts about the programme over time and describe ‘the factual’ for the treatment group (not the counterfactual). But changes observed by comparing before/after (or pre/post) data are rarely caused by the intervention alone, as other interventions and processes influence developments in time and space.

There are some exceptions in which ‘before’ versus ‘after’ will suffice to determine impact. For example, in the development context, supplying village water pumps reduces time spent fetching water. If nothing else of importance happened during the period under study, attribution is so clear that there is no need to resort to anything other than ‘before’ versus ‘after’ to determine this impact.¹²

Experts in CVE have noted this issue as a key conceptual problem in CVE evaluation, particularly as most programmes lack the tools (such as randomised, controlled trials) required

12. Frans Leeuw and Jos Vaessen, *Impact Evaluations and Development: NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), ch. 4.

to overcome it. That said, some experts believed that some lessons from the development arena, for instance US Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes, could be enlightening (see Chapter IV).

Addressing the Problem of Attribution in CVE

Overcoming the attribution problem in CVE evaluation is no easy task without access to experimental and quasi-experimental designs embedded in a theory-based evaluation framework:

- Randomised controlled trials are closest to the gold standard and are the safest way to avoid selection effects.
- Judgement-matching is a less precise method for selecting control groups using descriptive information from survey data; for example, to construct comparison groups.
- Benchmarking is a rough way to compare the value of a programme against another programme.

Challenge 3: The Problem of Measurement – Many Factors are Difficult to Measure Accurately

The two problem areas of agency and attribution have made measurement more difficult. This in turn has fed a view that what cannot be measured cannot be managed. The issue of measurement has many aspects. We focus on three that are important within the realm of CVE: measuring players' contributions; timing of measurement; and what to measure.

- **Who to 'measure':** because CVE projects involve multiple bodies, measurement can be difficult. The involvement of statutory, voluntary, corporate and community bodies in delivering an intervention or service makes it difficult to account for and to measure outcomes, particularly as it is

unclear what these bodies might have done in the absence of public money or public-sector steering.

- **When to 'measure':** counter-terrorism strategies involve committing to goals over a long period of time. Often there is not the appetite to wait until the completion of a long-term project before asking review questions. Arriving at an *ex-ante* evaluation judgement requires evaluators to take a view on decisions that relate to an uncertain future.
- **What to 'measure':** outcomes can be very difficult to measure, particularly where they are intangible (for example, trust, social capital and confidence).

A further perspective on measurement put forward by Canadian programme evaluation advisor John Mayne is that the key to evaluation is measuring with the aim of reducing uncertainty about the particular contributions made to an outcome.¹³ This improves focus and enables the identification of intended actions resulting in unintended consequences.

Understanding contribution, as opposed to providing attribution, is the essence of good evaluation. Understanding contribution has an element of the subjective, but this can be overcome by process models and logic models that probe the level of contribution of individual actions in a rigorous way. It is also important to consider context, as this often impacts on the outcomes of CVE programmes.

A final consideration when looking at measurement is the interpretation of data. Interpretation is subjective and the same information or data may be interpreted differently by different analysts, impacting measurement.

13. John Mayne, 'Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect', Institutional Learning and Change (ILAC) Brief 16, May 2008.

Addressing the Problem of Measurement in CVE

Some tools can assist in remedying these problems of measurement. However, in addressing issues such as ‘when’ to measure, thought must also be given to wider issues such as scope and principles of project planning and management:

- Logic models and contribution analyses can provide structured ways to identify what is important to measure.
- Economic evaluations can be useful where there are clear costs and benefits that can be monetised.
- ‘Futures thinking’ can help when considering what long-term future impacts to measure.
- Theory of change can help to break programmes down into measurable sections.
- Impact assessments provide a helpful way to think through an array of measurable outcomes.

Challenge 4: The Problem of Benefit – Dealing with Situations of Uneven Distribution of Costs and Benefits

It is important to understand who is benefiting (and to what degree) from a programme among the array of stakeholders, as well as who may be losing out. While this should be possible from the methodology employed (for example, from a logic model), it is rarely that simple, especially with projects that are operating in difficult or challenging environments.

Moreover, projects must consider that costs and benefits may be unevenly distributed: those who contribute most to a project may not be the beneficiaries, while benefits may also be incommensurate (for instance, an increase in security for one may result in a loss of privacy for another). Different groups might well value the same outcomes differently. The challenge is

to ensure the integrity of the evaluation so that any findings can be presented in a balanced way and are not biased towards one group over another.

Addressing the Problem of Uneven Benefit

There are methods to understand how different service users value different types of outcomes:

- Stakeholder analyses review the needs and concerns of the different actors involved in a programme, and can help to clarify stakeholders' values and priorities.
- Discrete choice models describe, explain and predict choices between two or more alternatives, helping researchers to understand how individual service users value different packages of options.
- Delphi surveys are exercises to collect large amounts of expert information and can help to identify future risks.
- Futures thinking can help to identify the dimensions and categories of future costs and benefits.

As a final note, it is worth considering the limitations to evaluation, particularly within the CVE field:

- **Lack of a comparison group:** the impact of CVE interventions is usually a challenge because of the absence of a control group against which the effects of a programme can be benchmarked.
- **Sample size:** individuals participating in CVE activities may be hard to reach and reluctant to engage in evaluation, limiting the size of data sets and making it hard to draw conclusions on the impact of the programme.

- **Inconsistency of data:** despite best practice, weaknesses in data collection such as sampling methods and human error can frequently lead to inaccuracies and inconsistencies.
- **Reporting bias:** interpretation of data is necessarily subjective and not all evaluators draw the same conclusions on the effectiveness and impact that a programme has had.

The tools available to assist in overcoming problems in evaluation are outlined in Chapter III. They can be used separately or in conjunction to create a richer evaluation of a CVE programme.

Chapter II: Key Points

- Good M&E systems are needed in order for CVE programmes to be implemented effectively, to ensure accountability, and to enhance the effectiveness of successor programmes.
- Establishing what should be evaluated and setting clear targets are crucial steps in developing well-defined indicators for the programme, which tell us whether or not it has been a success, and what factors did or did not contribute to this result.
- An ideal evaluation framework incorporates quantitative and qualitative data and methods, taking into account the context, using proxies such as behaviours, and making the most of expert judgement.
- Different tools and methods are needed to combat the challenges of agency, attribution, measurement and benefit in evaluating CVE effectiveness.

III. EVALUATION: TYPES, TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY

Overview: This chapter outlines key evaluation methodologies, tools and technologies to provide readers with a baseline understanding of what can help them in their work. The evaluation methodologies reflect key frameworks used in the public and NGO sectors, which practitioners may wish to consider in relation to measuring impact and effectiveness. The list of tools proposed is not exhaustive but are intended as a starting point.

3.1 Evaluation Types

3.1.1 Identifying the Right Type of Evaluation

Evaluations can be carried out at different levels of CVE programming. In a report from its symposium on measuring the effectiveness of CVE programming, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) recognises three levels based on whether the focus of the evaluation is on a particular project (a vertical evaluation); a policy theme or strategy – for example, CVE efforts through multiple agencies (a horizontal evaluation); or a broad range of programming that collectively contributes to CVE activities (a multidimensional evaluation).¹

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1. Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, *Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress* (Washington, DC:

Evaluations can be designed to answer many questions on topics such as how the policy was delivered, what difference it made, whether it could be improved and whether the benefits justified the costs. Below we explore key evaluation types used in the literature, which help those undertaking the evaluation to address the question that is most pressing for them.

The principal two evaluation types (formative and summative) are described below, followed by the subset of evaluation types:

- **Formative evaluations** tend to be ongoing evaluations, examining programme delivery and quality of implementation. The evaluation itself acts as a learning experience and is intended as a basis for improvement, by identifying any weaknesses or obstacles to achieving the programme's objectives. Assessments typically examine factors such as the progress of participants towards achieving the intended outcome, the efficiency of processes and examples of good practice.
- **Summative evaluations** tend to be undertaken at a programme's closing stages, assessing a programme's level of success. The evaluation examines the outcomes of the programme and compares them to pre-existing standards or benchmarks. This type of evaluation also helps to determine whether the programme can be said to have caused the outcome, to estimate the relative costs associated with the project, and to ascertain whether the programme should be repeated or replicated.²

Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013).

2. See Research Methods Knowledge Base, 'Introduction to Evaluation', 2006, <<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/intreval.php>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

The choice of evaluation approach should be based on a consideration of a number of factors: a statement of the policy's underlying theory or logic; the stated objectives; and a consideration of how the policy was supposed to have an effect. Having a clear idea about the questions that need to be addressed and the required type of evaluation at an early stage helps to inform the design of the CVE project and the expertise required.

The most suitable form of evaluation primarily depends on the core question being asked. If it is broad in scope it would benefit from a process evaluation,³ whereas if it is geared towards finding specific measures then an impact evaluation⁴ would be more successful. The choice of evaluation approach will therefore depend on issues such as:

- How complex the relationship between the intervention and the intended outcome is and how important it is to control for other drivers influencing the achievement of this outcome. If control is important, this might point towards an impact evaluation approach. Simple relationships can often be investigated just as robustly by process evaluations. More complex relationships often require impact evaluation.
- The 'significance' of potential outcomes to overall policy objectives. More limited, intermediate outcomes might be more readily evaluated robustly, but might not give a close or direct measure of the benefits of the policy.
- How significant the intervention is in identifying changes to processes and practices. This affects the extent to which the

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3. Process evaluations measure the quality of a programme or policy's performance by analysing its activities and operations in order to identify strengths and weaknesses.
 4. Impact evaluations focus on outputs and assess both the intended and, ideally, unintended changes that can be attributed to a particular intervention, comparing the results to its original objectives.

intervention could be expected to generate sufficient effect to show up amid other factors and drivers. The distinction between projects, policies and programmes, strategy and 'best-practice' initiatives is relevant, since these can vary significantly in terms of how much they represent distinct and identifiable interventions. Best-practice audits usually involve process evaluation, whereas strategic policies benefit from impact evaluation.

Stakeholders noted that there are a number of strands to CVE work, and that it is important from the start to be clear about which aspects of a programme you are interested in evaluating. It is rarely possible to evaluate everything when resources are limited. Practitioners suggested that there is a need to prioritise in the following areas:

- The success of activities and organisations that have been funded and whether they offer value for money.
- How CVE activities have contributed to other agendas; for example, women's empowerment, educational outcomes and wider community safety.
- Providing policy-makers with evidence on what types of projects are effective and the resources required to support them.
- Providing practitioners with evidence on what works and what does not, and how they can best implement their projects or programmes.

It is important to provide project and programme teams with training on how to evaluate, and a toolkit with which to do so. They must be involved in evaluation design and have the skills to carry out evaluations of their programmes for learning and accountability reasons. Stakeholders also advised fostering the

creation of an evaluation hub to centralise this process in the design, development and implementation of the project.

When developing an evaluation culture, only long-term investment in people and skills has a substantive impact. In the short term, embedding evaluation into programme development from the beginning reminds policy-makers and practitioners of the importance of evaluation.

3.2 Evaluation Tools

This section examines several examples of tools that can be used to measure the effectiveness and impact of interventions. Each model has different strengths in demonstrating particular aspects of a programme, depending on the purpose and object of the evaluation. It is important to note from the outset that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' model of evaluation, and CVE programmes should use a typology of common models.

3.2.1 Logic Model

What is it?

A logic model uses visual illustration to show how a programme is expected to work to mitigate a problem, as shown in Figure 4. Logic models are widely used in the planning and design of new interventions, in the management and, increasingly, in the evaluation of interventions post implementation. There are a number of different types of logic models including those focusing on activities, outcomes and theories. In order to achieve this, logic mapping requires you to identify and describe a number of key elements of your intervention. These typically include:

- The issues being addressed and the context within which the intervention takes place.

- The inputs (resources and activities) required in order to achieve the intervention’s objectives.
- Outputs (for example, target groups to be engaged, roads built and products developed).
- Outcomes (short- and medium-term results, such as changes in traffic flow levels and modal shifts).
- Impacts (long-term results such as a better quality of life, improved health, environmental benefits, and so forth).⁵

Figure 4: Example of a logic model.





Figure 5 is an example of a logic model for a crime prevention programme from Canada. It is a visual representation that links what the programme is funded to do (activities) with what the

5. Dione Hills, 'Logic Mapping: Hints and Tips', Tavistock Institute, London, October 2010, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3817/logicmapping.pdf>, accessed 21 May 2014.

Figure 5: Logic Model for the Crime-Prevention Programme.



programme produces (outputs) and what the programme intends to achieve (outcomes).⁶

How is it Used?

Logic models are widely used by government and non-government actors to demonstrate the causal relationship between investments, activities and outcomes of a particular programme. They do so by outlining a logical sequence of inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes and impacts.

What are the Advantages?

Logic models provide a clear framework and point of reference for participants to determine whether a programme is moving in the intended direction. They are useful for bringing together areas of planning, execution and evaluation under a shared approach.

What are the Disadvantages?

Although logic models can illustrate a logical pathway of events towards expected outcomes and impact, this does not necessarily end up being the case, especially if the intended outcomes are too ambitious. Thus, logic models are helpful for explaining intentions, but may not address the reality on the ground to the same degree of clarity. Logic models for CVE evaluation fall short when they become over-complicated and do not reveal resource use, reach or support other 'oversight' requirements. Finally, logic models are limited in providing robust evaluations in the short term and are best suited to long-term evaluations; this has limitations for evaluations intended for ministers who would

6. There are more details of this evaluation in Public Safety Canada, '2012-2013 Evaluation of the Crime Prevent Program: Final Report', October 2013, <<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/2013-vltn-crm-prvntn-prgrm/index-eng.aspx>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

prefer to show deliverables in the relatively short timelines of government cycles.

3.2.2 Theory of Change

What is it?

Many evaluations of intervention programmes use theory of change (ToC). Definitions of ToC vary and it may be best to consider ToC as an approach rather than a methodology, in that its successful delivery requires harnessing a range of methodologies.

ToC and logic models are frequently used interchangeably but there are subtle differences (Figure 6). Logic models graphically illustrate programme components, and creating one helps stakeholders to clearly identify outcomes, inputs and activities. In contrast, ToC links outcomes and activities to explain *how* and *why* the desired change is expected to come about.⁷

The aim of ToC is to identify individual ‘interventions’ or changes that bring about specific outcome(s). This aim is often represented in a chart format that lays out all of the inputs, processes and outputs relevant to a programme.

Figure 6: Summary of Differences between Logic Models and ToC.

Logic Models	Theory of Change
Representation	Pathway of Change
List of Components	Critical Thinking
Descriptive	Explanatory

7. Helène Clark and Andrea A Anderson, *Theories of Change and Logic Models: Telling Them Apart* (Atlanta, GA: American Evaluation Association, 2004).

How is it Used?

ToC works essentially as a series of critical-thinking exercises that provide a comprehensive picture of the short- and medium-term changes in a given programme that are needed to reach its long-term goals. ToCs differ from other evaluation models by starting with the result or end vision and working backwards in order to identify the steps required to achieve the end result, and then find the indicators for each precondition which can be used to measure success.

In the CVE context, in its best-practice guide for local practitioners implementing CVE, the Tavistock Institute has endorsed ToC as providing a useful framework,⁸ while the UK Home Office considers it to be a useful approach for regional Prevent co-ordinators.

What are the Advantages?

ToC evaluations are specific, and break programmes down into measurable compartments in order to identify best practice. They are able to specify the individual requirements needed to bring about a certain result, and are quantifiable and useful to measure specific goals and targets.

ToC requires users to identify underlying assumptions, which can be tested and measured, and encourages participation through being a 'living' framework. It is highly useful for identifying and measuring the success of a general strategy, rather than of short-term goals. Developing and reviewing ToC helps to clarify purpose, understand results and derive lessons learned.

8. HM Government, *Evaluating Local PREVENT Projects and Programmes: Guidelines for Local Authorities and their Partners* (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, August 2009).

What are the Disadvantages?

ToC can be seen as overly progressive and simplistic in its emphasis on end results. It does not look at structural imbalances, problems encountered or negative inputs that affect the causal nature of a process. It can be seen as overly inclusive and complex in its incorporation of external factors. The method is often regarded as being of greater use to programme managers than to programme designers and implementers, who may prefer to use logic models as they attempt to depict programme components so that activities match outcomes.⁹

*3.2.3 Peer-Group Review**What is it?*

Peer-group review is a method using two or more project groups to review each others' projects or programming with the objective of learning from the experience of others. The idea is to provide a collective learning process based on the experiences of another group, with the aim of improving quality and identifying key strengths. The process is widely used in medical and academic communities and is gaining prominence in policy fields. Peer-group review has been undertaken in Denmark by provincial authorities and in the UK by local authorities.¹⁰ Both examples resulted in local bodies combining the best practice of the other.

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9. Further information on ToC and logic models is available from the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 'Theory-Based Approaches to Evaluation: Concepts and Practices', <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/tbae-aeat/tbae-aeatb-eng.asp>>, accessed 21 May 2014.
 10. Tavistock Institute, 'A Peer Review of the Prevent Programme', 2011, <<http://www.tavinstitute.org/projects/a-peer-review-of-the-prevent-programme/>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

Lessons from the Front Line: Kenya Transition Initiative and its CVE Programme

The evaluation of the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) programme offers a good example of employing ToC to undertake a CVE programme evaluation. The KTI programme was a pilot of the new USAID CVE concept, operating through flexible funding mechanisms that support individuals, organisations and networks, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. The approach of the study was to begin by examining the outcome and end result of the initiative, before outlining a series of questions to determine how and why this result was achieved. Specific questions asked by the study included the following:

- Were the key programme concepts such as ‘extremism’ and ‘identity’ suitably defined and understood?
- To what extent were local drivers of violent extremism understood before the project began? Was sufficient research undertaken?
- Were some identified ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors more influential than others?
- Was this research consistent with the USAID Guide to Drivers report? Should other candidate ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors have been the subject of research? Was the planned focus on ‘pull’ factors achieved?
- To what extent was the KTI goal statement suitable in light of the above drivers?
- To what extent was the KTI goal statement achieved?

- To what extent was the results framework suitable in light of the project goal? Were suitable 'pull' and 'push' factors targeted through the intermediate results?
- To what extent were the intermediate results achieved? To what extent did individual grants achieve their objectives?
- To what extent were grants suitable in light of the project's objectives and results framework?
- Did the grants target vulnerable, or the most vulnerable, individuals?
- Was the project as innovative as was expected? Was the programme suitably flexible to changing contexts and ongoing lessons learned?

The KTI programme advised the evaluator about the methodological approach. These methods included a review of the KTI and related documents, spanning the programme phases; a series of key informant interviews with KTI staff, grantees and other stakeholders; and a set of focus group discussions with grant beneficiaries and observations of grantees.

The research team collected substantial qualitative evidence that the KTI contributed to its CVE goal, and the subordinate intermediate results. Other key successes of the programme were the flexibility provided by the grant mechanism, and its intentional emphasis on countering the 'pull' factors that drive violent extremism.

Source: James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, 'Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism Programming under the KTI', USAID, 2014.

How is it Used?

Peer review is a deliberative process, where an arranged meeting of core groups leads to the exchange of information with peer groups, who provide a critical yet collaborative function. Reflection over approaches and experiences takes place between the peers, where a number of outsider participants are also able to make an input.

In meetings, the focus is on probing the group's different experiences to identify strengths and weaknesses. An agreed set of themes is used to measure exactly what has been achieved among the individual groups in different areas. Through the collection of information via 'peers', a 'sense-making workshop' is then held to draw together all of the emerging strands of thinking.

What are the Advantages?

The peer-review process is ideal for identifying forms of best practice from a range of experiences. This is particularly valuable for CVE where various factors and differing environments can have an impact on identifying the causality behind any success or failure. The method is also useful for the cross-sectional evaluation of CVE programmes across local or state boundaries where the impact of decisions needs to be evaluated.

What are the Disadvantages?

The process is suited to programmes that have similar backgrounds. There is a risk of mirror-imaging by applying a 'one-case-fits-all' solution to a diverse and multifaceted problem. The method lacks in-depth study so often needs to be used in conjunction with another process such as ToC in order to gather background information and provide narratives to the groups involved. The method focuses on improving quality as opposed to overall results, so there is a risk of abstraction.

Lessons from the Front Line: Peer Review of CVE Activities in London and Lancashire, UK

During 2010–11, Tower Hamlets Council, the Lancashire Prevent Forum and the Local Government Group worked with a facilitator to create and conduct a Prevent peer-evaluation process, which consisted of a preparatory phase, three workshops and a dissemination event.

Preparatory phase: the initial phase involved developing local narratives to allow peers to begin articulating their local approach to delivering Prevent using a ToC framework. The exercise therefore entailed identifying the participating authorities' respective local contexts, the key assumptions on which the design of the programme was built, and their organisational capacity to handle CVE-related issues. The narratives also included the objectives that peers hoped to achieve and how.

Workshops: workshops involved senior stakeholders from the host local authority and police force, as well as peers from other areas. The sessions aimed to look in particular at the impact of the authorities' work in:

- Reducing the likelihood of individuals engaging in violent extremism.
- Contributing to the delivery of the national counter-terrorism agenda.
- Local partnerships between local authorities, the police, and statutory and community partners.

Peers worked in small groups. Within each of the three themes they explored their narratives in detail, testing assumptions and approaches, and where possible developing a simple ToC map, using it as an organising principle. The third and final session consisted

of a 'sense-making workshop', involving all peers. Stakeholders developed 'working hypotheses' on the basis of the learning and main themes that emerged from the discussions of the two workshops held in Tower Hamlets and Lancashire.

Impact: The participating authorities found the peer-review process to be a valuable experience. It provided the time and space for peers to be able to reflect on the CVE work undertaken to date in their own and partner authorities. These are some practical examples of how the peer-review process impacted peers' work:

- The challenging questions raised by peers enabled the authorities to think about new ways to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms.
- The process proved to be helpful in strengthening links and collective thinking, which fostered a positive group dynamic, built confidence and initiated a partnership-setting process.
- It allowed useful thinking to emerge around what the right balance is between a community-led and statutory-led approach to delivery.

3.2.4 Process Mapping

What is it?

Process mapping is a tool for graphically representing a series of tasks or activities that constitute a process.¹¹ It enables better understanding of the process examined, and identifies gaps, bottlenecks and other problems.

A process map in evaluation involves flowcharting inputs, processes and outputs in diagrammatic form in order to describe

11. Tom Ling and Lidia Villalba van Dijk (eds), 'Performance Audit Handbook: Routes to Effective Evaluation', RAND Europe, 2009, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR788.html>, accessed 21 May 2014.

the necessary tools, the range of required tasks and the key decisions to be made in bringing about a result. These can be used to identify structures, loops and actors that are essential to achieving outcomes.

How is it Used?

Having selected and recorded key processes, the next stage is to examine them critically and develop new processes where necessary. In many instances, the thoughts and discussions required to chart existing processes lead to easy identification of improvements. Analysing process maps in a structured way, known as critical examination, can identify process improvements. This basically involves the use of primary questions – what, how, when, where and who. Once established, creation of the new and improved process can begin. Figure 7 gives an example of process mapping.

What are the Advantages?

Flowcharting can be used to establish what is currently happening, how predictably and why. Process mapping can also measure how efficiently the process is working, and gather information to understand where waste and inefficiency exists. It is useful for developing new improved processes to reduce or eliminate inefficiency.

What are the Disadvantages?

Process mapping is weak at identifying assumptions and does not attribute specific goals towards a measurement of success. It is therefore unsuitable for measuring specific goals and outcomes of a process, but instead only identifies problematic areas.

Figure 7: An Example of Process Mapping.

	Description	Questions	Advantages	Disadvantages
Flowchart	Breaks down a process into sequential steps and decision points; depending on level of analysis, high-level, activity-level or task-level flowcharts are used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the steps of the process? • In which order do they occur? • When are decisions taken? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intuitive way of presenting a process, thus easy to conduct • Provides a very good overview of a process • Allows identification of redundant process steps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can become very tedious if high level of detail • Requires very high level of process knowledge
Deployment Flowchart	Breaks down a process into sequential steps and decision points; highlights the role of different actors in a process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the steps of the process? • In which order do they occur? • When are decisions taken? • Who is involved in the process? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Makes it easier to suggest the department which needs to make changes • Allows identification of responsibilities • Easy to produce when flowchart is already available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • May lose focus on problematic tasks or decisions
Process Definition Chart	Focuses attention on the context of a process by looking at inputs and outputs, resources and controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the inputs of the process? • What are the outputs of the process? • What resources are needed? • How is the process controlled? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Achieves breadth of subject matter, also discusses resources and constraints • Includes information about resources and controls; integrates the context into the process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approach is less intuitive • Difficult to pinpoint what is driving down value in a system

3.2.5 Cost–Benefit Analysis

What is it?

A cost–benefit analysis is a method for assessing the value of a project by comparing its costs to measures of its performance, or more generally to the value of benefits it produces. The analysis requires accurate cost data, as well as measures of performance in appropriate units and overall benefits. Cost–performance measurement is narrower in that it deals only with measures of performance as the basis for comparison.¹²

How is it Used?

Cost and performance data can be obtained from operational records, direct observation, surveys or group meetings at which those who perform the operations report and discuss costs and performance measures. Both one-time costs and ongoing costs should be included.¹³

What are the Advantages?

Cost–benefit analyses are an effective means to assess the value of a project or the value of the benefits it produces. Over both the short and longer term, such analyses can be used to determine whether or not the resources allocated to a programme are appropriate for achieving the intended outcome, as well as to determine the (primarily financial) implications of continued

12. See ‘Appendix A: Tools for Identifying and Evaluating Options’, in Anthony Cresswell et al., ‘And Justice for All: Designing Your Business Case for Integrating Justice Information’, Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, 2000.

13. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, ‘Assessing Program Resource Utilization When Evaluating Federal Programs’, <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/pubs/ci5-qf5/ci5-qf5tb-eng.asp>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

implementation. They can also be used to identify key risks that may prevent the goals and objectives of the programme being reached.

Cost–benefit analyses are highly quantifiable and results can be interpreted without difficulty, allowing readers and analysts to see the benefits of a particular process easily.

What are the Disadvantages?

The method places too much emphasis on cost and overlooks the efficiency and overall impact of a programme, as many benefits may not come directly from the cost. It is therefore not entirely suitable for looking at processes in the short term.

3.2.6 Delphi Survey

What is it?

Delphi exercises are a structured way to collect large amounts of qualitative information from experts in fields relevant to the issue being examined. Delphi surveys use ranking, scoring and feedback to arrive at consensus on an issue or a set of issues. They can assist with anticipating problems in achieving outcomes and building consensus on the direction and purpose of a programme.

In its conventional, ‘pencil and paper’ form, the Delphi method involves issuing questionnaires to participants in which they are asked to rank a series of items (in order of importance, likelihood of occurrence, and so on) over a number of rounds, interspersed with feedback collection. The exercise can be conducted remotely; there is no requirement for participants to be brought together in one place.¹⁴

14. Ling and Villalba van Dijk (eds), ‘Performance Audit Handbook’.

How is it Used?

Participants usually remain anonymous so as to protect the authority, personality and reputation of the individuals involved. This remains so until the production of the final report. The experts begin by answering questionnaires, which are then used by the facilitator to direct the survey and filter out any irrelevant information resulting from the experts' responses. Regular feedback on their own and each others' comments is provided by the experts to inform debate and prevent pre-held conceptions or groupthink. The areas of conflict are identified and deliberated until a consensus is reached. Figure 8 shows the steps taken in a Delphi survey.

What are the Advantages?


Typically used in business forecasting, this method allows scope for depth and rich descriptions of possible best outcomes. It enables incorporation of specialists in order to inform best practice. It also encourages feedback and all aspects of the process can be reviewed by participants.

In the context of performance evaluations, the Delphi method has a number of particularly advantageous features. First, it provides a structured means of collecting large bodies of qualitative and quantitative data in areas in which other forms of evidence may be thin on the ground. This can be particularly useful when scoping potential performance indicators in an unfamiliar setting. Second, by helping to bring participants towards consensus, it enables users to prioritise lists of possible evaluation options in a structured manner. This could be applied at both the early stages of a project, to identify key audit questions, and at the concluding stages, to help prioritise recommendations.

What are the Disadvantages?

The efficacy and impact of the process depends largely on the experts used in the process and the role of the facilitator in recording results. There are the usual risks of groupthink, consensus and confirmation bias, which can be mitigated by anonymity.

Figure 8: Example of steps taken in a Delphi survey.



3.2.7 SWOT Analysis

What is it?

SWOT analysis is a four-part system that aims to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of a process (Figure 9). Strengths include characteristics of the project that give it an advantage over others. The weaknesses are characteristics that place the team at a disadvantage relative to others. Opportunities are elements that the project could exploit to its advantage. Threats are elements in the environment that could cause trouble for the project.

How is it Used?

A single quadrant chart can be used to note down ideas from a group; this process is useful because it operates in a uniform format. It involves specifying the objective of the business venture or project and identifying the internal and external factors that are favourable and unfavourable to achieving that objective.

What are the Advantages?

The process quickly and efficiently identifies both the positive and negative attributes of a programme and its scope for the future and improvement. As a method of analysis it also clearly distinguishes between internal (SW – strengths and weaknesses) and external (OT – opportunities and threats) factors. Unlike most processes of evaluation, it is not designed with the sole purpose of evaluating profit-making processes.

What are the Disadvantages?

It overlooks individual processes involved in bringing about change, and is unquantifiable. It can be seen as being geared

towards confirming the benefits of a particular process because it fails to identify other alternatives.

Figure 9: Example SWOT Analysis.

	Helpful to Programme Outcome	Harmful to Programme Outcome
Internal Factors (Organisational Attributes)	Strengths	Weaknesses
External Factors (Environmental Attributes)	Opportunities	Threats

3.2.8 Contribution Analysis

What is it?

Contribution analysis is an approach for assessing causal questions and inferring causality in real-life programme evaluations; it does not allow for comprehensive evaluation. It offers a step-by-step approach designed to help managers, researchers and policy-makers arrive at conclusions about the contribution their programme has made (or is currently making) to particular outcomes (see the example in Figure 10). The essential value of contribution analysis is that it offers an approach designed to reduce uncertainty about the contribution the intervention is making to the observed results through an increased understanding of why the observed results have occurred (or not) and the roles played by the intervention and other internal and external factors.¹⁵

15. See Better Evaluation, 'Contribution Analysis', <http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/contribution_analysis>, accessed 22 May 2014.

What are the Advantages?

Contribution stories are beneficial to programmes that have a detailed ToC and a well-defined direction. Alongside ToC, a contribution analysis can provide evidence and a line of reasoning demonstrating that the programme has made a significant contribution towards the desired result. There are six steps to this method:

- **Set out the attribution problem:** determine the specific questions being addressed, such as ‘Has the programme caused the outcome?’
- **Develop a ToC and the risks to it:** develop the programme logic and results chain describing how the programme is supposed to work. Identify the main external factors at play that might account for the outcomes observed.
- **Gather existing evidence on the ToC:** use existing evidence – such as from past related evaluations or research, and from previous monitoring – to test the ToC.
- **Assemble and assess the contribution analysis, and challenges to it:** you will then be able to determine if it is reasonable to assume that the actions of the programme have contributed to the observed outcomes.
- **Seek out more evidence:** having identified where the contribution analysis is less credible, gather additional evidence to augment the analysis based on the results that have occurred.
- **Revise and strengthen the contribution story:** you should now be able to build a more substantive and thus more credible analysis, one that a reasonable person will be more likely to agree with.

What are the Disadvantages?

Contribution analysis is not an approach for comprehensive evaluation.

Figure 10: An example of a contribution analysis.




Figure 11: Summary of Evaluation Tools and their Uses.

Evaluation Tool	Advantages	Disadvantages	Use to...
Logic Model	Provides clear point of reference for participants on programme performance	Often over-complicated and does not clearly illustrate problems encountered	Demonstrate a causal relationship between investments, activities and outcomes
Theory of Change	Evaluations are specific and break programmes down into measurable compartments	Overlooks negative inputs, problems encountered and structural imbalances that affect the causal nature of a process	Measure the success of a general strategy over short-term goals
Peer-Group Review	Ideal for identifying best practice, especially across different sectors and regions	May not take into account local contexts or impose a basic solution for a complex problem	Improve quality of programme rather than achieve overall results
Process Mapping	Measures efficiency of programme and where waste or inefficiency exists	Unsuitable for measuring specific goals and outcomes, identifying only problem areas	Identify structures, loops and actors essential to achieving outcomes
Cost-Benefit Analysis	Results can be easily interpreted and risks easily identified	Overlooks the impact of programme and benefit of short-term processes	Assess the value of a project or the value of the benefits it produces
Delphi Survey	Can generate large bodies of data, encourages feedback and identifies priorities	Can have low efficacy: risks of 'groupthink', consensus and confirmation bias	Anticipate problems and build consensus on direction and purpose of programme
SWOT Analysis	Quickly and efficiently identifies positive programme attributes and scope for improvement	Unquantifiable; overlooks individual processes and fails to identify alternatives	Identify the internal and external factors in achieving the programme's objective
Contribution Analysis	Provides evidence and line of reasoning showing the extent of programme input towards the desired result	Cannot be used for comprehensive evaluation	Assess the contribution the intervention is making to observed results

3.3 Online Technologies

Using technology for M&E has increased in importance in recent years following a rise in the use of such media by large parts of the population globally. Authorities and local NGO actors can use new technology – such as social media – as part of the CVE programme-evaluation toolbox. For example, the US Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications aims to reduce radicalisation and extremist violence online by identifying in a timely manner extremist propaganda on the Internet and responding swiftly with counter-narratives. It has put in place diagnostic, Internet-based tools to support it in monitoring its effectiveness.

Social-media platforms can be used to disseminate counter-narratives to violent extremist beliefs online either through engaging in debate, sharing pictures and videos, or simply forming online communities opposed to violent extremism.¹⁶ Use of such platforms presents those evaluating projects with potential tools to record Internet traffic or understand impact through measures such as ‘retweets’.

The work carried out by researchers at the UK-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence is a further example of the use of social-media analysis to measure influence and impact.¹⁷ Specific methodologies include the monitoring and analysis of Twitter accounts and postings through:

- Examining links and ‘hashtags’ tweeted by users.
- Analysing the followers of anarchist accounts.

16. See, for example, the work of the Demos Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, <<http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/casm>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

17. See, for example, J M Berger and Bill Strathearn, ‘Who Matters Online: Measuring Influence, Evaluating Content and Countering Violent Extremism in Online Social Networks’, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College London, March 2013.

- Conducting a ‘gross impressions’ analysis, which counts the number of times tweets from a user have appeared in other users’ timelines.¹⁸

Lessons from the Front Line: Using Facebook ‘Likes’

Other examples where online social media has been used in this way include EXIT-Deutschland’s use of the Internet to spread information about the success of the Trojan T-shirt campaign. The CVE group disseminated T-shirts at a neo-Nazi convention bearing a far-right slogan that washed off to reveal the slogan ‘If your T-shirt can do it, so can you’. The use of YouTube, Twitter and Facebook to share the impact of the event not only increased the number of voluntary participants joining the CVE programme, but also spread awareness of the growing far-right movement in Germany. CVE programmes and police authorities can use social media to inform the public and gain support, ‘followers’ or ‘likes’ for activities similar to EXIT-Deutschland’s ideas around branding.

3.3.1 Advancing Data Collection

Other uses of technology to aid CVE efforts include the use of software to monitor and respond to potential violent acts being planned online.¹⁹ Advances in computer technology

18. See, for example, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher and James Sheehan, ‘Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy’, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College London, 2012.

19. Todd C Helmus, Erin York and Peter Chalk, *Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism* (Cambridge: RAND Corporation, 2013), <<https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/245/promoting-online-voices-for-countering-violent-extremism>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

have created the opportunity to store vast quantities of data previously unimaginable to earlier computer models. Also, advances in software and analytical capabilities have created new opportunities to input and process criminal data. Areas for application include geo-mapping of crime trends, monitoring online media, facial recognition technology used to analyse individual movements, and test-simulations of group behaviour.

Another area of advance in data collection is the use of data to identify crime hotspots, before cross-referencing the results with those of similar regions in order to test best practice. Some of these practices are in early stages of progress and require further development. New technology also enables the capacity to 'data mine' (for example, information gathered from online chat rooms) simultaneously across a broader spectrum of social-media platforms, crime databases and historical reports, and then to analyse all data rapidly. Gathering the right amount of data is crucial for sampling and conducting effective analysis.

3.3.2 CVE in the Local Community

Online technology has created a window of opportunity to improve the relationship between members of the public and law enforcement and help to build trust.²⁰ For example, many police forces and local authorities use Twitter to describe local issues, to outline initiatives to counter extremism, and to build up a relationship with community residents. Such use of media establishes trust and improves public confidence.

Online surveys can provide an efficient way of collecting information from different stakeholder groups, anonymously if

20. United Nations, *The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes* (New York, NY: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012), <http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.

necessary. Best results are achieved if the evaluators and those implementing the online survey collaborate in developing the survey from an early stage. Online surveys:

- Can be used to target specific stakeholder groups.
- Are widely used in the public and private sectors, and local communities may therefore feel 'comfortable' with them.
- Need to be carefully designed through a partnership between the researchers and web-survey implementers.

Defining Online Surveys

Online tools have become an extremely cost-effective method of conducting fieldwork for scientific and policy research and evaluation. Tools include web-surveys, opinion surveys, stated-preference surveys, online exercises and more open-ended forms of e-consultations.²¹

In the consumer area, these tools are frequently used by market-research companies to study likely markets for certain products and services through opinion surveys or general omnibus studies. Although it is difficult to characterise from a theoretical point of view, various types of stakeholder may be considered as relevant targets for this form of evidence gathering. For example:

- Civil servants and members of administrative departments.
- Members of local communities.
- Experts.
- Academics.
- Civil society stakeholders.

When to Use Online Surveys

In the policy-evaluation context, online survey tools are especially useful for gathering the honest views of experts, implementers

21. Ling and Villalba van Dijk (eds), 'Performance Audit Handbook'.

and programme participants, as respondents may feel that they are talking to a computer rather than a person. The successful use of online data-gathering techniques is a compromise among a number of factors, as are many methodologies.

The main consideration is that of understanding the implications of more complex instruments, given the specificities of using more traditional forms of data collection. Online surveys are particularly suitable in the following circumstances:

- **When the boundaries and characteristics of a topic or subject can be easily determined in advance:** it should be easier for those developing the survey instrument to identify questions with clear alternative answers, such as ‘important/not important’ or ‘agree/disagree’, thereby permitting extensive question sets. This method is particularly useful when trying to simplify questions that could be answered qualitatively (for example, ‘What do you think about...?’) so that they are presented quantitatively (for instance, ‘Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following...’).
- **When there is a large or unbounded sample:** online survey tools may be appropriate when considerations of robustness of sample size to population are of lesser importance.
- **When fast turnaround is necessary:** surveys can be developed extremely quickly, especially when an existing survey platform is established. Furthermore, some tools permit automated data extraction.
- **When budget is limited:** online tools may be a cost-effective alternative to more expensive forms of data collection (such as via telephone surveys), as they are relatively cheap to implement.

Chapter III: Key Points

- Formative evaluations strengthen or improve the object being evaluated; summative evaluations examine the effects or outcomes of the object.
- The choice of evaluation approach should be based on the policy's underlying theory or logic, the stated objectives, and a consideration of how the policy is supposed to have an effect.
- It is important to provide programme teams with training and a toolkit on how to monitor and evaluate their activities.
- Each evaluation tool has advantages and disadvantages, and should be chosen on the basis of the purpose of the evaluation.
- Online technologies can increase the reach of CVE programmes into local communities, and make a significant contribution to M&E through advanced data collection and online surveys.



IV. LEARNING FROM OTHER FIELDS

Overview: This chapter addresses what can be learned about evaluation from other social-policy fields: crime prevention, gang prevention, overseas development and peace-building.

CVE is not the only policy area that encounters challenges in policy and programme evaluation. In this chapter, we examine evaluation practices in the criminal-justice and overseas-development sectors. While these fields are very different from CVE, their evaluation systems are more mature and elements of their programmes can help to inform the approaches and methodologies used in CVE evaluation. The aim is to identify instances of good practice and lessons that can be applied to future CVE programmes.

4.1 The Criminal-Justice Sector

4.1.1 *Crime Prevention*

One of the most useful areas to examine for comparative purposes in CVE evaluation is crime prevention. CVE programmes can look to crime-prevention programmes as a key source of experience and best practice as the two fields face similar challenges. There is already a broad body of literature on the M&E of crime-prevention programmes (or lack thereof) and the challenges in

carrying out M&E in this field. These programmes are generally community-based; while this is not always the case for CVE, there are countries that incorporate a strong community presence in carrying out CVE activities.

As with crime-prevention evaluation models, effective models of evaluation for CVE need to be able to address the following issues:

- The causal links between a programme's assumptions and the outcomes desired: are CVE programmes based on a sound theoretical underpinning? Do community-based programmes reduce the incidence of radicalisation? Do they have other unintended impacts?
- The effectiveness of the processes involved in implementing the programmes: who should be funded? How and to what level? Who should drive the programmes? How can agencies best work together? Understanding what happens and why in a programme can determine why particular objectives were or were not achieved.¹
- The effectiveness of individual initiatives: how successful are different approaches? Which are most successful? Why? What long-term effects do they have on prevention? How appropriate are they to different contexts?
- The contribution of initiatives to wider community goals: health and wellbeing of the community and the government policy objectives of a 'safer community'.
- The cost-benefit of individual community-based initiatives and an overall assessment of a programme's multiple initiatives.²

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1. John M Owen and Patricia J Rogers, *Program Evaluation: Forms and Approaches* (St Leonards, Australia: Sage, 1999).
 2. Anona Armstrong and Ronald Francis, 'Difficulties in Evaluating Crime Prevention Programmes: What Are Some Lessons for Evaluators and

Overarching Lessons Learned in Crime Prevention

In order to develop models of evaluation that take into account longer-term results:

- Evaluations should not be limited to measuring outputs or even outcomes, but examine the underlying assumptions on which programmes are based.
- Evaluations should not be undertaken on an ad hoc basis once every few years, because there is no basis for comparative evaluation of the value of alternatives.
- The most useful evaluations are those that are planned and receive support from all involved.
- M&E should be built into the planning phase of each programme, not added on at the end.
- Indicators to measure outcomes should be agreed on by the stakeholders, as should be commitment to data-gathering.
- The evaluation designs need to take account of milestones and steps that signify progress towards achievement of goals and objectives.
- The designs also need to be flexible – should progress evaluations indicate a need for change, so too should the target of the evaluation change.
- Evaluations need to be both internal and external.
- The internal evaluations should focus on monitoring the key indicators and maintaining the documentation that will give substance to an external evaluation.
- External evaluations should meet the need for summative and formative purposes, for the assessment of efficiency, effectiveness and quality.

It is noted that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' model of evaluation for crime-prevention programmes; instead, a typology of common models is used. Many evaluation models in crime prevention, as with CVE, fall prey to the need for government departments to assess the narrow questions that policy planners need to answer – the implementation of the programme and achievement of specified outputs. Few models attempt to achieve any kind of examination of long-term programme results (which are important when evaluating CVE).


NCPC Programmes: Evaluation Planning of Crime-Prevention Programmes

Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) provides national leadership on effective and cost-effective ways to prevent and reduce crime by intervening on the risk factors before crime happens.³

The NCPC views evaluation as contributing in a variety of ways, including providing accountability and strategic structure, benchmarking, supporting results, and feeding into best practice and effective interventions in crime prevention. Evaluating crime-prevention programmes requires setting realistic outcomes to measure. The impact of a programme may not be visible for several years, therefore setting short- and medium-term outcomes to measure is important to determine whether the programme is on track to achieve its goals.⁴

Community-Based Programs', paper presented at the Evaluation in Crime and Justice: Trends and Methods conference, Canberra, 24–25 March 2003, <http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/evaluation/francis.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.

3. Public Safety Canada, 'Project Planning and Evaluation', <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/tls-rsrcs/prjct-plnng-eng.aspx>, accessed 22 May 2014.
4. *Ibid.*

Figure 12: Project Lifecycle.

Source: Public Safety Canada, 'Project Planning and Evaluation', <<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/tls-rsrcs/prjct-plnng-eng.aspx>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

4.1.2 Gang Prevention: Evaluation in Practice

The NCPC funded the Gang Prevention Strategy (GPS) between April 2007 and March 2011. The programme was implemented by Living Rock Ministries (a non-profit Christian organisation) in the Hamilton area, near Toronto; it targeted people aged between thirteen and twenty-five who were deemed either to be at risk of gang involvement or to be already involved in it. The programme aimed to:

- Increase awareness of the consequences of gang involvement.
- Encourage youths to adopt a less positive attitude toward gangs.
- Increase motivation to participate in pro-social behaviours.
- Decrease risk factors that contribute to interest in gang activity.
- Increase protective factors that contribute to youth's interest in pro-social activity.

The programme aimed to achieve these results by assigning each participant a coach with whom they have regular sessions, and participation in a range of programme activities. The programme recruited participants through outreach, financial incentives and word of mouth; they were then required to complete a quiz to determine eligibility. Of the group of applicants, 230 were considered eligible, but 10 per cent were not interested and 3 per cent did not provide consent. Ultimately, 201 carried on to participate in the programme.

There were high drop-out rates (43 per cent) for various reasons including moving location of residence, incarceration and full-time employment. Only eighty-six youths completed

the six-month programme. Similar issues can be expected in CVE programmes.⁵

Evaluation of GPS

Initially a quasi-experimental design⁶ was chosen to evaluate the GPS programme. 'Pre' and 'post' surveys were planned for the treatment and comparison groups but as a comparison group could not be established, the design was changed to a single group (repeated measure) design.

The methodology involved comparing pre-surveys with post-surveys, which were conducted six months after the end of treatment through the programme. Those participants who were still available received follow-up surveys every six months. Availability of participants after a programme is a major challenge that occurs in evaluating the impact of both crime prevention and CVE work.

The evaluation consisted of quantitative and qualitative data. Evaluators collected qualitative survey, quiz and interview responses, and quantitative data gathered through ongoing programme monitoring on case management, programme activities, youth-crime statistics and other hard numerical evidence. They then compared sample groups in order to understand the differences between subset groups in terms of risk levels and 'dosage' (hours spent with coaches and in programme activities, with 242 hours of case management

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5. Public Safety Canada, *Gang Prevention Strategy: Building the Evidence – Evaluation Summaries*, 2012-ES-23 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2014), <<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/gng-prvntn-strtgyl/index-eng.aspx>>, accessed 22 May 2014.
 6. A 'quasi-experiment' can be defined as a study to estimate the causal impact of an intervention on its target population; unlike 'true' experiments, quasi-experimental design features a controlled, rather than a random, process of sampling.

deemed to be the threshold between ‘low’ and ‘high’ dosage). As is common, qualitative data was used to support and provide depth to quantitative results.⁷

Evaluation Findings

There were numerous implementation challenges that CVE programmes can and should learn from, including:

- Issues over inconsistent data entry.
- Data collection.
- Quality of training.

The programme was originally designed to target only those at risk of becoming involved in gangs. However, during the course of the programme some youths who were already involved in gangs began to participate, and coaches felt unprepared to deal with these higher-risk participants during the early stages. The possibility of similar situations occurring in a CVE programme is high, as a programme may be designed to target those at risk of radicalisation but attract those who are already radicalised. Preparing for these eventualities is important.

Developing accurate risk factors relevant to youth in the Hamilton area was a further challenge. That said, determining unique and individual risk factors is less important than determining whether the risk factor identified is evidence-based.⁸

Evaluation Limitations

Many of the limitations of evaluation are shared between CVE and crime and gang prevention. These include the lack of a control group, small sample size, inconsistencies of data and

7. Public Safety Canada, *Gang Prevention Strategy*.

8. *Ibid.*

reporting bias. In particular, the lack of a comparison group makes programme causality-attribution challenging and therefore positive results relating to gang involvement cannot definitively be attributed to the programme.

Relatively low numbers of participants are available to complete post-surveys, which limits quantitative insight and understanding into programme effectiveness. The recording and collection of data is always a challenge, and relationships between participants and programme officers are likely to result in interviewer bias. An awareness of these limitations is necessary, and a number of tests to deal with low participant numbers and to determine statistical significance can be found in the evaluation literature.⁹

4.2 Peace-Building and Overseas Development

4.2.1 *Evaluation in Peace-Building*

Evaluating peace-building and conflict-resolution programmes is similar to CVE evaluation in that there are very few formalised procedures or methods to refer to. Similarly, it is also difficult to ascertain which factors have contributed to the improvement or deterioration of a situation when evaluating. However, the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology¹⁰ from this area is a useful and relevant source for those engaging in CVE evaluation and monitoring.

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9. For guidance on the principles of statistical significance, see Creative Research Systems, 'Significance in Statistics and Surveys', <<http://www.surveysystem.com/signif.htm>>, accessed 22 May 2014; StatPac, 'Statistical Significance', <<http://www.statpac.com/surveys/statistical-significance.htm>>, accessed 22 May 2014.
 10. Mark Hoffman, 'Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology', Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2004.

Evaluating peace-building initiatives in situations defined by conflict requires a flexible, case-by-case approach according to what the specific scenario allows for and restricts. The PCIA approach looks beyond questions of success or failure of the intended outputs, outcomes, goals and objectives, and considers a broader base for assessment.

For instance, when trying to determine the impact – negative and positive, direct or indirect, and intentional or not – of a particular peace-building or conflict-resolution project, the PCIA approach will analyse a wide spectrum of criteria to gauge project impact: the institutional capacity to manage or resolve violent conflict and to promote tolerance and build peace; military and human security; political structures and processes; economic structures and processes; and social reconstruction and empowerment.

When measuring the impact of CVE interventions, therefore, the PCIA approach teaches us to take into consideration broader social, political and economic factors that may have an influence on the planned programme or initiative.

4.2.2 Overseas Development

There are many lessons that evaluators of CVE can learn from overseas evaluation of development projects. The overseas development sector has developed tools to monitor complex interventions more effectively. Moreover, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards have motivated those in the sector to reflect on the importance of evaluation and to ensure evaluations ask the right questions of the right people.

DAC guidelines also note that providing training to local partners on evaluation methodologies and techniques is a necessary part of ensuring accurate data. If the data-collection process is outsourced to local partners, evaluators need to have

confidence in the data collected; training therefore supports the accuracy of fieldwork and empowers local partners. Embedding evaluation into the project or programme from the beginning is also key to adjusting the programme, as lessons are learned and processes develop.¹¹

USAID's evaluation of CVE projects in East and West Africa provides a useful example of how to embed evaluation into projects from the outset, as outlined in the box below.¹²

USAID's Evaluation of a CVE Project in East and West Africa

USAID's work on CVE overseas provides an excellent case study to assess the use of evaluation methods and distil best practice. USAID developed CVE programmes in East and West Africa, which used a risk assessment for violent extremism to help identify key drivers, before then working with local partners to identify at-risk populations around which to focus their programme activities. The programme had a multilayered approach, promoting non-violence, training for community leaders and community engagement. USAID conducted mid-term evaluations of their CVE programmes in West Africa (in 2011) and East Africa (in 2013) using a mixed-method approach incorporating quantitative and qualitative methods.

The quantitative part of the evaluation involved the use of a fifteen-question survey looking at predetermined drivers of violent extremism. The survey was given to the treatment group and a comparison group in order to compare results. During analysis of the data, it was found that the programme had a more significant impact on correlated indicators such as civic engagement than

11. *Ibid.*

12. USAID, 'Evaluating USAID's CVE Projects in East and West Africa Methodologies and Best Practices June 2013.

priority indicators such as opposition to violence.

Lessons learned in carrying out the survey including the training of local partners and data collectors (as above) and the importance of local language skills. Of high importance was the identification of comparison clusters. In West Africa, the clusters were chosen where there had been 'minimum' programme activity – however, a result of the programme was regional radio outreach, and so therefore no cluster was completely untouched by programming. In East Africa, the evaluation identified three different groups. The first included training-programme graduates; the second, those who entered the programme but did not complete it fully; and the third, those who had no contact with USAID programmes at all. The distinction between those who completed the programme and those who did not is important to note when conducting an impact assessment based on an individual's experience.

The qualitative aspects of the evaluation included desk reviews, key-informant interviews and focus groups. The qualitative work was used to verify the findings of the survey and add credibility to the final results. The use of qualitative methods in combination with the survey also allowed for greater depth and understanding of survey responses.

For example, the focus groups uncovered drivers of conflict unrelated to violent extremism and demonstrated the influence that current news stories have on perceptions, which work to influence the survey responses of participants in this context. Taking into account external causal factors, considering demographics, and ensuring accurate knowledge of cultural and political norms within a community is essential when carrying out a study that should be controlled for; it and is also essential to fully understand results.

When evaluating CVE, we need to keep in mind what can be measured with any credible level of accuracy. For example, it is nearly impossible to measure how many individuals did not join or support a terrorist group solely as a result of a programme intervention, as the programme does not target those who are so far along the process of radicalisation that this could be identified. However, the individual or community perceptions of key drivers to violent extremism can be measured, such as community engagement and economic opportunities. Identifying the right indicators is one of the most important steps in developing a CVE programme and accurately evaluating its impact.

Chapter IV: Key Points

- Crime prevention is a more mature field where lessons can be learned and applied to CVE, particularly in relation to community-based programmes.
- Challenges relating to inconsistent data entry, data collection and quality of training have been identified from gang-prevention programmes that should be considered for CVE.
- Evaluating peace-building and conflict-resolution programmes is similar to CVE in that both require a flexible, case-by-case approach.
- Analysing the lessons of overseas-development evaluation can help CVE evaluators to learn lessons about providing training and embedding evaluation into programmes from the very beginning.

V. LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Overview: In this chapter, we briefly outline a number of different CVE programmes in a selection of GCTF states, in order to provide policy-makers and practitioners with a sense of the current state of play and a ready reference. While CVE initiatives within many of these countries are in their early stages, important lessons can be drawn from these examples.

As demonstrated by the evolution of CVE policies and strategies outlined in Chapter I, many countries are beginning to focus on CVE programming and initiatives. Many of these efforts are still in their early stages and attempts to evaluate them have been limited. Nonetheless, instances of good practice are identifiable in many countries' experiences and there are important early lessons that can be adapted for future programmes.

5.1 Canada

Canada's 2012 counter-terrorism strategy, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*, was the country's first such strategy.¹ It focuses on four areas to deter the terrorist threat: preventing people from becoming involved in terrorism; detecting and investigating those involved in terrorist operations; denying

1. Government of Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*.

terrorists the means to pursue terrorist activities; and responding effectively to any attacks that occur. Canadian government efforts on CVE are multipronged and cut across the counter-terrorism strategy's framework. The government approach aims to address social aspects of radical violence and security aspects of violent extremism. Most initiatives to date have focused on the challenging area of prevention.

For example, public engagement activities led by the Canadian government aim to develop mutual trust and understanding with the numerous communities it serves in order to address local concerns. Specific programming related to building awareness and providing education to address the threat of radicalisation to violence is conducted in partnership with various influencers, including NGOs and community leaders.

Both programmes have an evaluative component with the RCMP, in partnership with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, developing a model for determining a pathway of community engagement. The RCMP's review of its community-engagement strategy and its collaboration with the IACP on a set of core CVE community-engagement principles² signal Canada's focus on understanding how evaluation can be applied effectively. The RCMP's approach is simple (but rigorous), which can be helpful for practitioners on the ground to understand how successful they have been in their community-outreach efforts.

2. International Association of Chiefs of Police CVE Working Group, 'Community Outreach and Engagement Principles', August 2012, <http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP-COT_CommPolicingPrinciples_FINALAug12.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.

5.2 Denmark

Denmark has a longstanding programme in CVE focused on supporting local governments and actors in preventing and acting on radicalisation and extremism through the following strands of activity: counselling; supplementary training – both intensive and short introductory presentations; tools and methods for practitioners; and information material (for example the Handbook Series in CVE³).

Evaluating Intervention Programmes in Denmark

Practitioners in Denmark have made significant effort to evaluate their CVE programming, particularly on interventions targeted at individuals who were deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. These are their key lessons:

- **Data validation:** ask the participants as well as the professionals in order to get a more complete picture.
- **Engage:** ask the participants as soon as possible after the intervention – try to integrate a concise questionnaire into the effort.
- **Repeated engagement:** continue evaluation after the effort, making this an iterated, repeatable process if possible.

Additionally, Denmark has sought to integrate an awareness and preventive effort in its general crime-prevention activities and social-welfare system, and considers CVE a preventive, social agenda, rather than a security agenda.

Evaluation experts in CVE from Denmark have highlighted to practitioners the importance of evaluation, using a ‘hierarchy of

3. See Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs website, <<http://sm.dk/en/responsibilites/integration-and-democracy/preventing-extremism/the-booklet-series-2018preventing-extremism2019>>

evidence'. Usefully, this hierarchy not only noted what evidence is desirable, but also acknowledged the difficulties of obtaining such information.

5.3 Germany

The German government has funded a range of programmes for fighting and preventing right-wing extremism, including various de-radicalisation programmes. Principal among these is EXIT-Deutschland, an NGO undertaking CVE work.⁴ For each individual case, EXIT aims to identify the appropriate form of intervention.

EXIT is a good example of the importance of considering the proportionality required for an evaluation. The organisation has a 'networked' nature and little contact with its clients, so an overly systematic evaluation may not capture the positive outcomes that are being generated over an extended period.

For example, a mid-term evaluation of EXIT's activities by the German government suggested that although there are higher drop-out rates in EXIT-Deutschland (because its interventions are voluntary), there was a considerable rate of overall success in de-radicalising participants. EXIT was judged to be rigorous and effective.

EXIT feedback on the evaluation process was that evaluation in the NGO context (and in dealing with right-wing extremists) could be challenging for three reasons:

- NGOs have inadequate resources to support the evaluation process.
- Building trust between clients and EXIT staff takes time.
- The process of de-radicalisation is not linear.

4. See EXIT-Deutschland's website, <http://www.exit-deutschland.de/>,

5.4 Norway

CVE policy is undergoing significant change in Norway in the wake of the July 2011 terrorist attack by Anders Behring Breivik.⁵ The model of CVE activity has been established in many Norwegian municipalities drawing on existing, co-ordinated local services in crime-prevention activity.

Parental Network Groups in Norway

One example of an evaluation in Norway at the project level is a parental-network group, which has successfully intervened to help youth disengage from neo-Nazi and other racist groups. Between 1995 and mid-2000, some 130 parents of 100 youths participated in parental-network groups targeting disengagement. By the end of that period, 90 per cent of the youths were no longer involved in a right-wing group. An evaluation of the project found that 'parental involvement played a decisive role in many cases, although numerous other factors were also important in the decision to leave the group'.*

*. Hilgunn Olsen, 'Å være foreldre til en nynazist [To Be Parents of a Neo-Nazi]', Department of Criminology, Oslo, 2001. The original Norwegian version of the report is available at <<https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22529/2983.pdf?sequence=1>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

Local authorities and local police management have established police councils for co-operation and co-ordination of local crime-prevention measures, a local-authority model that brings together those public authorities, professional groups and

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5. On 22 July 2011, Breivik bombed government buildings in Oslo, killing eight people, before shooting sixty-nine people at a Workers' Youth League camp on the island of Utøya.

voluntary organisations working together. The model provides arenas for various parties to meet and exchange information and assessments – increasing knowledge on crime prevention and providing the opportunity to co-ordinate measures in different sectors that can positively strengthen each other. Knowledge-based crime prevention, early intervention, and strengthened and co-ordinated local crime prevention work are key elements in the Norwegian approach.⁶

5.5 Sweden

The Swedish CVE strategy emphasises involving all of society in efforts to prevent the types of radicalisation signalled by increased interest in terrorist activities or violent tendencies, especially measures that target and research ‘the breeding grounds of terrorism’.⁷ It includes initiatives to overcome exclusion (local causes of grievance) by promoting an integration policy and democracy. It espouses the wider use of dialogue as a means of creating more opportunities for representatives of civil society to give their views of threat pictures and possible measures.

The strategy highlights the need for closer study of possible ways to provide support to individuals who want to leave extremist, violence-promoting environments. The country has significant experience in dealing with white-power groups, and it is clear that the state recognises that similar (but bespoke)

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6. See Politiet, ‘National Crime Prevention Policies’, <http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Evenements/10th_ICPC_Colloquium/Proceedings/Ingvild_Hoel.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.
 7. Qatar International Academy for Security Studies, ‘Countering Violent Extremism: Community Engagement in Programmes in Europe: Phase 2, Vol. I’, February 2012, p. 25, <<http://www.niacro.co.uk/filestore/documents/Countering%20Violent%20Extremism-%20QIASS-%202012.pdf>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

programmes may have merit in preventing or disrupting other types of terrorism.⁸

The Swedish authorities have endorsed (and funded) a number of community-based CVE programmes. These include the project Fryshuset and the group Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice. Encouraged by state agencies, these organisations are attempting to counter narratives that might draw vulnerable individuals into violent extremism, and provide support to those trying to leave extremist organisations.

Sweden's EXIT programme was established in 1998 to offer a way out for members of white-supremacist groups. The Swedish programme rests on the notion that people do not become members of the groups through ideology, but because they feel socially excluded, lack acceptance, and have a strong desire to acquire power, status and identity. The programme has a strong psychological focus and is very therapy-oriented, including a range of cognitive and behavioural techniques in order to help integrate those who have severed ties with regular society.

Although the programme has not been officially evaluated, the high-profile nature of EXIT within Sweden has gained widespread recognition and increased public awareness, and is now seen as an important response to far-right extremism within Sweden.

The Swedish Ministry of Justice launched a pan-European, two-year project in 2013, which aims to enhance our understanding of what works in preventing and countering right-wing extremism. It is funded by the European Commission, and involves ten European countries pooling and sharing their knowledge and understanding of the extreme right-wing threat.⁹

8. *Ibid.*

9. For further details, see Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 'Preventing and Countering Far-Right Extremism and Radicalisation: European Cooperation',

5.6 United Kingdom

In 2010–11, the UK government reviewed the Prevent policy.¹⁰ Although many of the efforts by the Home Office and Department for Communities and Local Government were judged to be valuable, the Prevent review suggested that the M&E of Prevent projects had not been sufficiently robust to justify the sums of public money spent on them.

The government said that evidence of effectiveness and value for money would be required for projects to maintain funding. Improvements in the evaluation architecture in the UK included situating evaluation specialists at the heart of the unit undertaking Prevent policy to provide on-the-spot advice and to help build an evaluation culture.

A senior lawyer, Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, was appointed to provide expert, independent oversight of the review. The objectives of the government's review of Prevent were as follows:

- Ensure Prevent is proportionate and focused.
- Look at the purpose and scope of the Prevent strategy, its overlap and links with other areas of government policy, and its delivery at local level.
- Examine the role of institutions – such as prisons, higher- and further-education institutions, schools and mosques – in the delivery of Prevent.
- Consider the role of other Prevent delivery partners, including the police and other statutory bodies.
- Consider how activity in the UK can be better co-ordinated with work overseas.

<<http://www.strategicdialogue.org/sweden-actionresearch/>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

10. HM Government, 'Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation', London, June 2011.

- Examine M&E structures to ensure effectiveness and value for money.

While much of the review process is not in the public domain, the government stated that, as part of the review, a consultation process began on 10 November 2010 and ran for three months. A web-based questionnaire sought views on specific aspects of Prevent: over 400 responses were received. There were eleven consultation events held around the country, which attracted approximately 600 attendants. A series of focus groups were also held.

Channel Programme Development of ‘Vulnerability’ Indicators

The Channel programme benefits from an evaluation framework, which has recently been strengthened with the development of twenty-two ‘vulnerability’ indicators.* Channel assesses the vulnerability of an individual using a consistently applied assessment framework built around three dimensions: engagement with a group, cause or ideology; intent to cause harm; and capability to cause harm.

The dimensions are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (to no longer intend to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

* The full list of vulnerability indicators is contained in HM Government, Channel: Vulnerability Assessment Framework (London: The Stationery Office, October 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118187/vul-assessment.pdf, accessed 22 May 2014.

5.7 United States

The Department of Homeland Security announced a CVE strategy in 2011 entitled ‘Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States’. This was the first to have targeted domestic-grown terrorism in the US at the local level.

The strategy elaborates on the federal government’s existing efforts and emphasises the need to work together with diverse communities to protect the civil rights and civil liberties of all individuals at local level – a key facet of the work undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties since its inception. The three priority challenges that the strategy identified are:

- To enhance federal engagement with and support local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists.
- To build government and law-enforcement expertise in preventing violent extremism.
- To counter violent, extremist propaganda while promoting US ideals.

Domestically, the US uses a number of programme-evaluation frameworks and in recognition of the developmental nature of the CVE-evaluation field, the National Institute of Justice (part of the Department of Justice) has commissioned a number of research studies to identify promising practices of evaluation, having noted that very few studies have scientifically evaluated community-level efforts to prevent radicalisation.¹¹

Overseas, USAID has harnessed its significant experience and expertise in evaluation in the development domain and applied it

11. US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, ‘Research and Evaluation on Radicalization to Violent Extremism in the United States – FY 2013, Notice for Tender 2013’, CFDA No. 15.560, <<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl001061.pdf>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

to its CVE programming, producing guidance and toolkits (this is explored further in Chapter IV).

Chapter V: Key Points

- Analysing case studies from overseas enables us to adopt best practice and lessons learned, which can then be used in choosing the optimal evaluation method for a particular context.
- The review of different countries' programmes demonstrates the increasing complexity and sophistication of CVE initiatives, frequently overlapping with other policy areas and incorporating a wide range of actors and stakeholders.
- Countries have little experience in this area and evaluation systems are immature, but many are increasing their evaluation efforts in order to justify the resources that are allocated to them.
- Cases of good evaluation practice show that evaluation needs to be integrated from the outset, as part of the planning stage of any CVE programme.



FINAL WORD

THIS HANDBOOK is one of a number of outputs contributing to the Government of Canada-led workstream, providing guidance on good practice and lessons learned for evaluating the effectiveness of CVE programming.

This initiative is being led under the auspices of the GCTF Working Group on CVE. The GCTF is an informal, multilateral platform focused on supporting the UN's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy efforts. The GCTF has now become a key body in shaping CVE policy and practice internationally.

The GCTF has emphasised that CVE requires a multifaceted approach, as various factors can drive violent extremism. The prerequisite of an effective, results-oriented CVE policy is to comprehend the complexity of violent extremism; this requires a joint effort at local, national, regional and international levels and a focus on evaluation.

CVE is a growing and evolving realm of policy and practice. Stakeholders acknowledge that evaluation in CVE is still an emerging field and that part of this can be attributed to the lack of evaluation of projects and understanding of what constitutes a successful intervention. The latter is particularly challenging, as CVE is a field in which governments and practitioners are faced with measuring a 'negative' or a 'non-event'. It is important to be

able to assess whether and when a programme is ‘successful’ or ‘effective’.

The continued endurance of CVE depends on it demonstrating that the projects conducted under its auspices deliver impact, insights and return on investment. Undertaking effective evaluation for accountability and learning purposes is crucial to ensuring that CVE can continue to be sustained as a viable policy approach.

Harnessing technology and learning from other fields are important in the development of CVE and in applying effective evaluation. Long-versed in the challenges of conflict prevention and violence reduction, areas such as peace-building and crime prevention – and their related methods and practices – can help to develop a more expansive understanding of violent extremism and its causes, as well as a more localised, measurable and sustainable approach to countering it.

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